Retaliatory Action in United States and European Union Trade Law: A Comparison of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Council Regulation 2641/84 by Leirer, Wolfgang W.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 20 | Number 1 Article 3
Fall 1994
Retaliatory Action in United States and European
Union Trade Law: A Comparison of Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974 and Council Regulation
2641/84
Wolfgang W. Leirer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wolfgang W. Leirer, Retaliatory Action in United States and European Union Trade Law: A Comparison of Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 and Council Regulation 2641/84, 20 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 41 (1994).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol20/iss1/3
Retaliatory Action in United States and European Union Trade Law: A
Comparison of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Council
Regulation 2641/84
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This article is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol20/iss1/3
Retaliatory Action in United States and European
Union Trade Law: A Comparison of Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Council
Regulation 2641/84
Wolfgang W Leirert
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 43
II. SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 ................. 46
A. Procedural Law of Section 301 ...................... 46
1. Initiation of an Investigation ..................... 46
a. Initiation by Petition .......................... 46
b. Self-Initiation ................................. 49
i. Section 302(b)(1) ........................ 49'
ii. "Special 301" .... ........................ 49
iii. "Super 301" .............................. 50
2. Request for Consultations with the Foreign
Government Concerned...................... 51
3. Public Hearings and Submission of Written Briefs
and Rebuttal Briefs .............................. 51
4. Consultations .................................... 51
5. Request for Formal Dispute Settlement Under
Applicable Trade Agreement ..................... 52
6. USTR Determination ............................ 52
B. Substantive Law of Section 301 ...................... 53
1. Trade in Goods, Services, and Investments ....... 53
2. Mandatory Action ................................ 54
a. Denial of U.S. Rights Under a Trade
Agreem ent .................................... 54
i. Trade Agreement ......................... 54
ii. Denial of Rights .......................... 56
t Wolfgang W. Leirer is Rechtsreferendar, Court of Appeals, Munich, Germany. Visit-
ing Fellow at the Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law, University of
Georgia School of Law, 1994. J.D., University of Augsburg, Germany, 1993; LL.M., University
of Georgia, 1994. I wish to thank Professor Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Executive Director of
the Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law, University of Georgia School
of Law, for his help in the publication of this Article.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
b. Denial of Benefits of the United States Under
a Trade Agreement ........................... 56
c. Unjustifiable Foreign Trade Practices ......... 57
i. Unjustifiability ............................ 57
ii. Injury .................................... 58
d. Exceptions to Mandatory Retaliation .......... 59
3. Discretionary Action ............................. 60
a. Unreasonable Acts........................... 60
i. The General Definition of
"Unreasonable" .... ....................... 60
ii. Specific Unreasonable Practices ........... 62
b. Discriminatory Acts ........................... 62
c. Injury. ................................ 63
4. Retaliatory Authority ............................. 63
C. Judicial Review of Section 301 Actions ............... 64
1. Lack of Judicial Review Provisions in
Section 301 ...................................... 64
2. The Political Question Doctrine .................. 65
a. Justiciability .................................. 66
i. Violation of a Trade Agreement .......... 66
ii. Unjustifiable Foreign Trade Practices ..... 66
iii. Unreasonable Foreign Trade Practices .... 66
b. Embarassment ................................ 67
i. Negative Final Determination ............. 68
ii. Positive Final Determination .............. 68
III. COUNCIL REGULATION 2641/84 .......................... 69
A. Procedural Law of Council Regulation 2641/84 ...... 69
1. Initiation of an Examination Procedure .......... 69
a. In Response to a Complaint by a Private
Party ......................................... 70
i. Admissible Complaint .................... 70
(A) Community Industry ................. 70
(B) Proof of the Existence of an Illicit
Commercial Practice ................ 72
(C) Proof of an Injury Resulting from the
Illicit Foreign Commercial Practice 73
ii. Decision of the Commission Whether to
Initiate an Examination Procedure ........ 74
b. In Response to a Request of a Member State.. 75
c. Self-Initiation by the Commission ............. 76
2. Consultations with the Foreign Government
Concerned ....................................... 77
3. Public Hearings and Submission of Written Briefs
and Rebuttal Briefs .............................. 78
4. Report of the Commission and Decision on Which
Further Steps to Take ............................ 78
[VOL. 20
1994] COMPARISON OF RETALIATORY TRADE SANCTIONS 43
a. The "Guillotine Procedure" .................. 79
b. Procedure Under Article 113 of the Treaty of
R om e ........................................ 80
5. Dispute Settlement Procedure .................... 80
B. Substantive Law of Council Regulation 2641/84 ...... 81
1. Substantive Law Requirements for Retaliatory
A ction ........................................... 81
a. Illicit Commercial Practices ................... 81
i. Trade Practice ................... ......... 81
ii. Attribution to a Third Country ........... 82
iii. Incompatible with International Law or
with Generally Accepted Rules ............ 83
(A) International Law ................... 83
(B) Generally Accepted Rules ............ 83
iv. Injury to a "Community Industry" ......... 85
b. Full Exercise of the "Community's Rights" .... 85
2. Retaliatory Authority ............................. 86
C. Judicial Review of Actions Taken Under Council
Regulation 2641/84 ................................. 86
1. Refusal to Initiate an Examination Procedure ..... 87
2. Termination of an Examination Proceeding and
Adoption of Commercial Policy Measures ........ 89
V. COMPARISON ............................................. 89
A. Procedural Law ..................................... 90
1. Initiation of an Examination Procedure .......... 90
2. Course of the Examination Procedure ............ 93
B. Substantive Law ..................................... 93
1. Mandatory and Discretionary Action .............. 93
2. Actionable Practices .............................. 93
C. Judicial Review ...................................... 95
V. CONCLUSION ............................................ 95
I. Introduction
Though trade relations between the European Union (EU) and
the United States are very close,' their economic relationship has un-
dergone a number of severe crises during the last few years.2 This rela-
tionship is especially important in light of the fact that economic
matters should become prevalent in U.S.-EU relations in the years to
I The European Union and the United States are each other's largest single trading
partner and the world's two largest trading entities.' The European Union accounted for
23.4% of world trade (excluding intra-Union trade), the United States for 19.7%, and Japan
for 8.6%. STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ExTERNAL TRADE AND BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, RECAPITULATION 1958-1992, at 94 (1993).
2 For a discussion of recent trade conflicts, see Randy E. Miller &Jessica A. Wasserman,
Trade Relations Between the European Community and the United States: An Overview of Current
Issues and Trade Policy Institutions, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. RV. 393 (1992).
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come as the significance of defense and security issues declines due to
the end of the cold war.3 Though a trade war between the two giants,
both of which possess an enormous retaliatory power, could have disas-
trous results, the tendency to take recourse to unilateral trade dispute
resolution measures is increasing on both sides of the Atlantic.
Both the United States and the European Union have adopted
legal instruments aiming at allegedly unfair foreign trade practices. In
the Trade Act of 1974, Congress empowered the President to suspend
or withdraw the benefits of trade agreements and to impose additional
duties, or other import restrictions, on products from countries engag-
ing in unfair trade practices. 4 In 1984, partly in response to section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the Council of the European Communi-
ties enacted Council Regulation 2641/84 which provides for retaliatory
power in cases where third countries use "illicit" commercial practices
against EU producers. 5 Not surprisingly, the first action of the Council
under the new regulation was directed against the United States.6
Correspondingly, from 1985 forward, the U.S. Executive made in-
creasing use of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. In nearly one
quarter of all cases, section 301 actions were aimed at allegedly unfair
trade practices of the European Union.7 Recently, section 301 has
again aroused the concern of the European Union because President
Clinton renewed "Super 301" by Executive Order dated March 3,
3 Id. at 394-95.
4 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43 (1975) (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)). However, the power to restrict imports from countries unfairly
discriminating against U.S. exports has explicitly been vested in the Executive Branch for
already more than one hundred years. In 1890, Congress granted the President the power to
impose a retaliatory tariff schedule on certain agricultural goods from countries levying du-
ties on U.S. products which the President deemed to be "unequal or unreasonable." Act to
Reduce the Revenue and Equalize Duties on Imports and for Other Purposes (Tariff Act of
1890), ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612. In 1934, Congress amended the TariffAct of 1930 and
again provided for presidential authority analogous to that of section 301. Act of June 12,
1934, ch. 474, § 350, 48 Stat. 943, 943-44 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1366
(1988)). Under the new section 350(a) (2) of the amended 1930 Tariff Act, the President was
entitled to proclaim modifications of existing duties (decreases and increases) and to sus-
pend the application of such a proclaimed decrease of duties to products of any country
"because of its discriminatory treatment of American commerce . .." Id. at 944. Finally, in
1962 Congress passed the immediate predecessor of section 301, section 252 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, which was comprised of detailed provisions concerning unilateral
retaliatory action in cases of unfair foreign practices. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 252, 76
Stat. 872, 879-80 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988)).
5 Council Regulation 2641/84 of 17 September 1984 on the Strengthening of the
Common Commercial Policy with Regard in Particular to Protection Against Illicit Commer-
cial Practices, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1.
6 See Notice of Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning Illicit Commercial
Practices within the Meaning of Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84, Consisting of the Exclusion
from the [U.S.] Market of the Unlicensed Importation of Certain Aramid Fibre Manufactured
by Akzo NV or Its Affiliated Companies outside the United States, 1986 O.J. (C 25) 2.
7 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES
(1993), reprinted in Int'l Trade Rep., Import Reference Manual (BNA), 49:0841-0864 (Nov.
24, 1993) [hereinafter USTR SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES].
1994] COMPARISON OF RETALIATORY TRADE SANCTIONS 45
1994.8 The European Union, admittedly, was "not very happy"9 with
this decision since the dismantling of section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 has been one major objective of European trade negotiators dur-
ing the seven years of the GATT's Uruguay Round negotiations.10 The
Union now fears that Clinton's decision "revealed the true face of the
Clinton administration's trade policy."'"
The renewal of "Super 301" only adds to the already existing
problems with section 301. Three member states of the European
Union-Italy, Greece, and Spain-found themselves placed on the
"watch list" under the "Special 301" provision of the Trade Act of
1974.12 The Clinton administration has expressed an interest in giving
the provision a "fresh direction" by using it more aggressively. 13 In
March 1994, U.S. retaliation against France under section 301 result-
ing from French efforts to restrict imports of U.S. fresh fish was barely
prevented. The situation necessitated a last minute tentative agree-
ment between the United States and France. 14
Since unilateral U.S. action under section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 would certainly lead to strong European counterreactions, it is
worthwhile to examine and compare the procedures utilized by the
United States and the European Union to address situations where a
trading partner uses practices which, in the eyes of the other, are un-
fair and violate their export interests. Therefore, this Article will ana-
lyze the procedural as well as the substantive law of section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 and Council Regulation 2641/84. The efficiency of
the two instruments will also be compared. Part one will deal with the
procedural law of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, including the
prerequisites for triggering an investigation and discussing the course
of such an investigation. 15 An examination of section 301's substantive
law will follow. The discussion will include an analysis of the condi-
tions under which mandatory or discretionary action can be taken by
8 Exec. Order No. 12,901, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (1994).
9 Trade Policy: Japan, EU Express Concern About Clinton's Super 301 Renewal 11 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 368 (Mar. 9, 1994) [hereinafterJapan, EUExpress Concern] (quot-
ing statement of a senior European Commission trade official).
10 Id. at 369.
11 Id.
12 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1993 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARUERS 102, 140, 241 (1993). Portugal was only removed
from the "watch list" in 1990. Id. at 225. The International Intellectual Property Alliance
(IIPA), which represents eight trade associations, wants to go much further and is pressing
the Clinton administration to place not only single Member States but the whole European
Union on the "watch list." Intellectual Property: Industry Presses U.S. to Act Against 36 Countries
for Copyright 'Piracy', 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 275 (Feb. 23, 1994).
13 Intellectual Property: Shapiro Tells Panel Administration Will Give 'Special 301'Fresh Direc-
tion, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 648 (Apr. 21, 1993) (quoting testimony of Ira
Shapiro, general counsel for the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, before the Senate
Finance International Trade Subcommittee).
14Japan, EU Express Concern, supra note 9, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 389.
15 See infra part II.A.
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the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and of the scope of
the USTR's retaliatory power.1 6 Moreover, it will be shown that deci-
sions taken by the USTR cannot be reviewed by the courts. 17 Part two
will discuss Council Regulation 2641/84, the European instrument of
trade retaliation, in similar fashion.18 Next, this Article will compare
the two instruments with regard to their procedural as well as their
substantive law and with respect to the justiciability of decisions taken
by the USTR and the Commission.' 9 Finally, the Article will provide
an explanation as to why section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 can be
characterized as the more efficient, and therefore more successful,
instrument.20
II. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
Section 301, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988,21 empowers the USTR to investigate "unfair" foreign
trade practices and to take retaliatory action against such foreign trade
practices.22
A. Procedural Law of Section 301
A section 301 proceeding typically includes six distinct steps: (1)
an initiation of an investigation; 23 (2) a request for consultations with
the foreign government(s) concerned; 24 (3) a public hearing and sub-
mission of written briefs and rebuttal briefs;25 (4) consultations;2 6 (5) a
request for formal dispute settlement under the applicable trade
agreement;2 7 and (6) a determination by the USTR. 28
1. Initiation of an Investigation
Section 301 investigations may be initiated either in response to a
petition of a private person or by the USTR on a self-initiated motion.
a. Initiation by Petition
Section 302 of the Trade Act of 1974 permits any "interested per-
son" to file a petition with the USTR requesting retaliatory action
16 See infra part I.B.
17 See infra part .C.
18 See infra part III.
19 See infra part IV.
20 See infra part V.
21 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C. app.).
22 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
23 Id. § 2412(a) and (b) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.0-4 (1994).
24 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(1) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.5 (1994).
25 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (4) and (b)(1)(A); 15 C.F.R § 2006.7-9 (1994).
26 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (3) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.11 (1994).
27 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.6 (1994).
28 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.12 (1994).
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under section 301.29 Both the Trade Act of 197430 and the federal
regulation on "Procedures for Filing Petitions for Action under Sec-
tion 301 of the Trade Act of 1974"31 contain rather broad definitions
of the term "interested person."32 In fact, the definition is so broad
that most parties have little difficulty establishing that they qualify as an
"interested person" under section 302.33 Under these definitions, the
term encompasses all U.S. producers, exporters, importers, or inves-
tors affected by the foreign trade practice as well as trade unions repre-
sented in a negatively affected industry and representatives of
consumer interests. More generally, "any other private party repre-
senting a significant economic interest affected" is included.34 Pursu-
ant to section 302(a) (1) of the Trade Act of 1974, the petition must set
forth the allegations supporting the request.3 5 The petition, inter alia,
must briefly describe the petitioner's negatively affected economic in-
terest, identify the rights of the United States being violated, or the
unreasonable foreign practices in question, and clarify the degree to
which U.S. commerce is burdened or restricted.3 6
Immediately following the receipt of a petition, the USTR must
notify the foreign government of the allegations and request that gov-
ernment to provide further information on its trade practice.3 7 At the
same time, the USTR asks all members of the interagency Section 301
Committee for their advice.38 On that basis, the USTR has to deter-
29 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1).
30 Id § 2411(d)(9).
31 15 C.F.R. § 2006 (1994).
32 Martin Nettesheim, Sec. 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Response to Unfair Foreign Trade
Practices, in U.S. TRADE BARRIERS: A LEGAL ANALYSiS 353, 367-68 (Eberhard Grabitz et al. eds.,
1991).
33 Bart S. Fisher & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for
U.S. Exporters of Goods, Services, and Capital, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 569, 602 (1983). See
Michael B. Devine, The Application of EEC Regulation 2641/84 on Illicit Commercial Practices with
Special Reference to the U.S.A., 22 INT'L LAw. 1091, 1098 (1988). See generally Blake K. Thatcher,
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility Against Alleged Unfair Trade Practices by the Japanese
Government, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 492, 501-02 (1987).
34 15 C.F.R. § 2006.0(b) (1994).
35 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (1988).
36 15 C.F.R. § 2006.1 (1994). Before filing a petition with the United States Trade Rep-
resentative (USTR) potential petitioners can ask the USTR or the Chairman of the Section
301 Committee for help concerning the requirements of an acceptable petition and with
respect to further information on the allegedly unfair foreign trade practice. They can even
submit a draft petition to the USTR or the Chairman of the Section 301 Committee who then
will comment on the draft and propose corrections. 2 UNITED STATEs IMPORT TRADE LAW
§ 42.11 (Eugene T. Rossides et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter IMPORT TRADE LAw]; Judith H.
Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures, and
Developments, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 633, 645-46 (1986). Even if the petition does not
substantially comply with these requirements, the USTR (through the Chairman of the Sec-
tion 301 Committee) can accept it and proceed to a decision whether to initiate an investiga-
tion. 15 C.F.R. § 2006.2 (1994); Thatcher, supra note 33, at 506.
37 Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 647 n.82 (citing 15 C.F.R. § 2006.4 (1994)). If the
foreign government fails to provide sufficient information, the USTR makes his determina-
tion on the basis of the best information available. 15 C.F.R. § 2006.4 (1994).
38 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3 (1994). The interagency Section 301 Committee is a standing
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mine whether to initiate an investigation within 45 days from the re-
ceipt of the petition.3 9
When determining whether the initiation of an investigation de-
manded by a private- party under section 302(a) of the Trade Act of
1974 is within the USTR's complete discretion, an important distinc-
tion must be made between petitions alleging the denial of U.S. rights
under a trade agreement, or the violation of a trade agreement, on
one hand, and petitions alleging unjustifiable, unreasonable, or dis-
criminatory foreign trade practices, on the other hand.40 The legal
basis for this distinction is to be found in section 302(c) of the Trade
Act of 1974. This section provides that:
[i]n determining whether to initiate an investigation under subsection
(a) or (b) of any act, policy, or practice that is enumerated in any
provision of section 301(d) [i.e., unreasonable, unjustifiable or dis-
criminatory acts], the Trade Representative shall have discretion to de-
termine whether action under section 301 Would be effective in
addressing such act, policy, or practice. 4
1
Since the denial of rights under a trade agreement, or the violation of
a trade agreement, are practices not mentioned in section 301 (d) of
the Trade Act, the initiation of petitions alleging such practices is not
within the discretion of the USTR.42 Consequently, where the viola-
tion of a trade agreement is alleged, the USTR's decision on the initia-
tion of an investigation can only be based on legal considerations, and
not on policy reasons. 43 In cases where section 301 (c) of the Trade Act
of 1974 provides for broad discretion, however, the USTR is permitted
to consider policy reasons when deciding on the initiation of a section
301 investigation. 44
committee chaired by the USTR and composed of representatives of the Departments of
State, the Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Agriculture, and' Labor as well as representatives of
the Office of Management and Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers. Bello &
Holmer, supra note 36, at 646.
39 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (2) (1988).
40 Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 368.
41 19 U.S.C. § 2412(c) (1988).
42 Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 368 n.101.
43 lit There are many reasons that the USTR may decide not to initiate an investiga-
tion. For example, the USTR may decline to initiate an investigation because: (1) the alleg-
edly unfair foreign trade practice is not actionable under section 301; (2) the petition
contains insufficient information on the foreign trade practice; (3) a trade agreement is in-
volved in the practice and the United States is unlikely.to be successful in a formal dispute
resolution procedure; and (4) the petitioner can file for relief under another trade remedy
provision. Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 647-48. See also Nettesheim, supra note 32, at
368.
44 Policy considerations, preventing the USTR from initiating a section 301 proceeding
include, for example, the political inappropriateness of an investigation (even though the
foreign trade practice would theoretically be actionable under section 301) and the lack of
significant economic impact of the unfair foreign practice on U.S. exporters (only in cases
where an injury test is not necessary). Shirley A. Coffield, Using Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 as a Response to Foreign Government Trade Actions: When, Why, and How, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 381, 390 (1981). See also Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 368; David M. Pedley, A
Definition for "Unreasonable" in Section. 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: A Consideration of the United
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Regardless of the USTR's determination, the decision must be
made public in the Federal Register.45 If the USTR decides to initiate
an investigation, he must also publish an abstract of the petition in the
Federal Register. 4 6 If the USTR does not initiate an investigation, he is
required to publish a summary of his reasons for the negative determi-
nation in order to inform the petitioner.4 7
b. Self-Initiation
i. Section 302(b)(1)
Under section 302 (b) (1),48 the USTR is empowered to self-initiate
an investigation with respect to any matter which could be actionable
under section 301, after consultation with advisory committees estab-
lished pursuant to section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974.49 In this case,
a petition by a private party is not required. Here again, pursuant to
section 302(c), the USTR has broad discretion in deciding whether to
initiate an investigation if the case does not involve a violation of a
trade agreement.50
ii. "Special 301"
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 198851 intro-
duced mandatory self-initiation of section 301 investigations 52 against
countries that have been identified by the USTR as "priority foreign
countries" (so-called "Special 301"). 53 Under section 182(a)(2) of
the Trade Act of 1974, 54 "priority foreign countries" are countries
which deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights or refuse fair and equitable market access to U.S. persons relying
upon intellectual property protection. 55 Although, under section
302(b) (2) (A), 56 self-initiation of investigations against these countries
is mandatory, the USTR may avoid self-initiation by invoking the eco-
nomic interest exception. 57 Under this exception the USTR does not
need to initiate an investigation if he thinks that an investigation
States-Thailand Tobacco Dispute, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 285, 291 (1991); Fisher & Steinhardt,
supra note 33, at 602 n.163.
45 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (3) and (4) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3 (1994).
46 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (4); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3(b) (1994).
47 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (3) 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3(a) (1994).
48 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1) (1988).
49 Id. § 2155.
50 Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 369. See also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
51 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. and
50 U.S.C. app.).
52 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2) (A) (1988).
53 1& § 2242(a)(2) (1988).
54 Id. § 2242(a)(1) (1988).
55 Id.
56 Id. § 2412(b) (2) (A).
57 David Palmeter, Section 301: The Privatization of Retaliation, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 101,
108 (1990).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 20
"would be detrimental to United States economic interests."5 8 Despite
the fact that Congress wanted to compel the USTR to investigate
against "priority foreign countries" by enacting "Special 301,"59 the
economic interest exception nevertheless provides broad discretion to
the USTR.60
iii. "Super 301"
Like "Special 301," "Super 301"61 was added to the Trade Act of
1974 by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 198862 and
basically constitutes another self-investigation procedure.63 The provi-
sion expired in 1990 but was renewed by Executive Order on March 3,
1994.64 "Super 301" requires the USTR, on the basis of the National
Trade Estimate Report,65 to identify "priority foreign country practices
the elimination of which is likely to have the most significant potential
to increase U.S. exports."66 Within twenty-one days of the submission
of the National Trade Estimate Report, the USTR has to self-initiate a
section 301 investigation with regard to all of the priority foreign coun-
try practices identified. 67 Once initiated, these investigations are sub-
ject to the normal section 301 procedures, 6a except that in the
consultations with the foreign countries concerned, the USTR must
seek an agreement providing for the elimination of unfair foreign
trade practices as soon as possible. 69
If the USTR decides to self-initiate an investigation, he is required
to publish his decision in the Federal Register.70 From January 1990 to
May 1993, self-initiated investigations slightly outnumbered investiga-
tions initiated by a petition pursuant to section 301 (a) of the Trade Act
of 1974.71
58 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2) (B) (1988).
59 See S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1987). The objective "was to en-
courage a more active use of the President's power to self-initiate section 301 investigations."
Id. at 75.
60 Kenneth J. Ashman, The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 - The Section 301
Amendments: Insignificant Changes from Prior Law?, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 115, 146 (1989).
61 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988).
62 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. I,
§ 1302(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1176 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988)).
63 See generally Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 369.
64 Exec. Order No. 12,901, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (1994).
65 Pursuant to section 181 (b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, the USTR has to submit the
National Trade Estimate Report to the President and to selected committees of the two
Houses of Congress on or before March 31 of each calendar year. 19 U.S.C. § 2241(b) (1)
(1988).
66 Exec. Order No. 12,901, sec. 1(a), 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (1994).
67 Id. sec. 2.
68 Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 370.
69 Exec. Order No. 12,901, sec. 3, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727-28 (1994).
70 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1)(A) (1988).
71 Five investigations were initiated by private petitions (Docket Nos. 301-80, 301-82,
301-83, 301-84, and 301-90). Three were "normal" self-initiations (Docket Nos. 301-81, 301-
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2. Request for Consultations with the Foreign Government
Concerned
If the USTR decides to commence a section 301 investigation, he
must request the foreign government concerned for consultations on
the date of the initiation. 72 This request may be delayed for up to 90
days if the USTR believes that more time for the preparation of the
consultations is needed. 73 In cases involving a trade agreement, the
time span for consultations is limited to 150 days, or even less if the
trade agreement involved provides for a shorter consultation period.7 4
If the consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable solution of
the dispute within these 150 days, the USTR is required to trigger the
formal dispute settlement procedures provided for in the trade
agreement. 75
3. Public Hearings and Submission of Written Briefs and
Rebuttal Briefs
Since section 302(a) (4) of the Trade Act of 1974 requires the
USTR to "provide opportunity for the presentation of views concern-
ing the issues," 76 all interested persons must submit written briefs. 77 If
they want to contest the information provided by the other party, par-
ties are also permitted to prepare rebuttal briefs. 78 Moreover, at any
stage of the investigation, a petitioner, or any interested person, can
demand to present their views at a hearing. The USTR is obliged to
hold such a hearing.79
4. Consultations
During a section 301 investigation, the USTR is required to con-
sult with the petitioner and to seek the advice of relevant commit-
tees,8 0 such as the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and
Negotiations.8 1 The USTR can also request the views of the Interna-
87, 301-88) and four were self-initiations under section 301 (b) (2) (A) (Special 301) (Docket
Nos. 301-85, 301-86, 301-89, and 301-91). USTR SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES, supra note 7.
72 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(1) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.5(a) (1994).
73 19 U.S.C. § 2413(b)(1) (A) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.5(b) (1994). The USTR can de-
lay up to 90 days, but he is required to consult with the petitioner before he makes his
determination.
74 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.6 (1994).
75 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (2); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.6 (1994).
76 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (4) (1988). See also Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 649.
77 15 C.F.R. § 2006.8(a) (1994).
78 Id. § 2006.8(c) (1994). Rebuttal briefs will be entertained, but these are limited to
identifying errors of fact or analysis that were not pointed out in the briefs or hearings. Id.
79 19 U.S.C. § 2414(b)(1)(A) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.7 (1994). See alo IMPORT TRADE
LAw, supra note 36, § 42.15.
80 19 U.S.C. § 2414(b) (1) (B) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.11 (1994).
81 19 U.S.C. § 2155(b) (1988). Another important committee in this context is the Sec-
tion 301 Committee which meets weekly to discuss pending cases and petitions and to ana-
lyze special issues in detail. Bello & Holmer; supra note 36, at 646-47, 649.
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tional Trade Commission concerning the probable impact of the pro-
.posed retaliatory action on the U.S. economy.82 One purpose of such
a consultation would be to help avoid any negative effects on industries
other than those petitioning for a USTR investigation. 83
5. Request for Formal Dispute Settlement Under Applicable Trade
Agreement
During the consultations with the foreign government concerned,
the USTR and the foreign government may not be able to agree on a
mutually acceptable solution to disputes arising under the applicable
trade agreement within the time frame provided by section 303(a) (2)
of the Trade Act of 1974.84 In such a situation, the USTR must initiate
the formal dispute settlement procedure provided for by the trade
agreement.85
6. USTR Determination
On the basis of the USTR investigation, consultations with the for-
eign government,. and any formal dispute settlement proceedings, the
USTR must make a final decision as to whether the foreign trade prac-
tice is actionable under section 301,86 and if so, what retaliatory action
should be taken.8 7 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 tightened the time limits with regard to the classification of.a
foreign trade practice as unfair.88 If the investigation involves a trade
agreement, the USTR has to make an unfairness determination within
thirty days after the dispute settlement procedure under that trade
agreement was concluded,8 9 or within eighteen months after the initia-
tion of the investigation (regardless of whether the dispute settlement
proceedings under the trade agreement are still going on), whichever
is earlier.90 If the investigation does not involve a trade agreement, a
final decision on retaliatory action must be taken twelve months after
the initiation of the investigation. 91 Different time limits, however, ap-
ply for unfairness determinations under "Special 301."92 Under "Spe-
cial 301," the USTR must make a final decision no later than six
82 19 U.S.C. § 2414(b)(1)(C) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.11 (1994).
83 Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 651.
84 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (2) (1988). Subsection (a)(2)(A) sets the "close of consultation"
as the period specified in the trade agreement, and subsection (a) (2) (B) sets the period at
150 days after the consultations are commenced. Id.
85 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (2); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.6 (1994).
86 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a) (1) (A) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.12 (1994).
87 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1)(B) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.12 (1994).
88 Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301 (a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1164 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1988)); Ashman, supra note 60, at 137-38.
89 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a) (2) (A) (i) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.12(a). (1994).
90 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2) (A) (ii) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.12(a) (1994).
91 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a) (2) (B) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.12(b) (1994).
92 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2) (1988).
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months;93 in complex and complicated cases, the determination must
occur no later than nine months after the self-initiation of a "Special
301" investigation.94 All USTR determinations have to be published in
the Federal Register. 95
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act also provides for
time limits concerning the implementation of action. 96 Retaliatory ac-
tion must be implemented within thirty days after an unfairness deter-
mination was made by the USTR.97 Under certain circumstances, 98
however, the USTR may delay implementation for up to 180 days.99
B. Substantive Law of Section 301
1. Trade in Goods, Services, and Investments
The substantive law of section 301 covers not only foreign prac-
tices concerning the trade of goods but also practices impeding U.S.
trade in services if these services are associated with international
trade.10 0 The term "services" is very broad and must be construed to
include the transfer of information as well as banking, insurance, or
broadcasting activities.1 01 Unfair-constraints on U.S. direct investment
abroad are also actionable under section 301 if the U.S. investment
concerned has implications for the trade in goods and services. 10 2
However, only actions of a government or an instrumentality thereof
(regardless of Whether it is a federal, state, or local government en-
tity)10 3 can be subject to a section 301 investigation. 10 4
93.d. § 2414(a)(3)(A) (1988).94 I1& §.2414(a)(3)(B).(1988). 
.
95 Id. § 2414(c) (1988).
96 Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301(a), 102" Stat. 1107, 1172 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2415(a)(2) (1988)).
97 19 U.S.C. § 2415(a)(1) (1988).
98 [T]he Trade Representative may delay, by not more than 180 days, the imple-
mentation of any action that is to be taken under section 301
(i) if -
(I) in the case of an investigation initiated under section 302(a), the peti-
tioner requests a delay, or
(II) in the case of an investigation initiated under 302(b)(1) or to which
section 304(a) (3) (B) applies, a delay is requested by a majority of the rep-
resentatives of the domestic industry that would benefit from the action, or
(ii) if the Trade Representative determines that substantial progress is being
made, or that a delay is necessary or desirable, to obtain United States rights or
a satisfactory solution with respect to the acts, policies, or practices that are the
subject of the action.
Id. § 2415(a) (2) (A).
99 Id.
100 See i& § 2411 (d)(1)(A) (1988). Though the majority of cases involved trade in
goods, the very first complaint filed under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 dealt with
trade in services. See Guatemala Cargo Preference case, No. 301-1, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,134
(1975).
101 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d) (1) (A). Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 360.
102 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(1)(B) (1988).
103 it, § 2411(d)(7) (1988).
104 Id See also Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 360:
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2. Mandatory Action
One of the most important modifications made to the substantive
law of section 301 by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 was the creation of two different classes of action First, the 1988
Act introduced mandatory action directed against the violation of in-
ternational legal rights of the United States in general and of U.S.
rights under trade agreements in particular. Discretionary action di-
rected against other unfair foreign trade practices was also addressed
by the new legislation.'05
Section 301(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, provides for
mandatory action where: (1) the rights of the United States under any
trade agreement are being denied; 10 6 or (2) "an act, policy or practice
of a foreign country (i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions
of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade
agreement,"' 0 7 or (ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts U.S.
commerce.'
0 8
a. Denial of US.' Rights Under a Trade Agreement
i. Trade Agreement
For the purposes of section 301, the term "trade agreement" has
been interpreted very narrowly by the USTR109 to include only the
GATT and agreements approved by Congress under section 3(a) of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (the MTN11° Codes).11' Though in at
least one case the term of "trade agreement" was expanded to include
a bilateral agreement,112 treaties of friendship, commerce, and naviga-
105 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (b) (1988). Discretionary action under the statute applies not to just
any other unfair practice, but only to those acts, policies, or practices which are unreasonable
or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce, see id. § 2411 (b)(1), and under
circumstances where action by the United States is appropriate, see id. § 2411 (b) (2).
106 Id. § 2411(a)(1)(A) (1988).
107 Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
108 Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B) (1988).
109 Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 634-35 n.4.
110 "MTN" stands for Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (1988).
III Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 362; Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 634-35 n.4;
Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade
Cases, 21 INT'L LAw. 211, 212 n.3 (1987).
112 Memorandum ofJuly 31, 1986, for the United States Trade Representative, Determi-
nation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,811 (1986) (in which the
President stated that "any future failure by the Government of Japan to meet the commit-
ments and objectives of the Agreement [between the governments of Japan and the United
States regarding trade in semiconductors] would be inconsistent with a trade agreement or
an unjustifiable act that would burden or restrict U.S. commerce"). Thereby, the President
explicitly characterized the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Accord of 1986 as a "trade agreement"
under section 301(a) (1) (A) or (B) (i) (19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1) (A) or (B)(i)). See also Bello &
Holmer, supra note 36, at 635 n.9; Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 362 n.61. For the text of the
accord, see Arrangement Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products, Sept. 2, 1986, U.S.-
Japan, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1409 (1986); see also Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, The United States-Japan
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tion (FCN treaties), and other bilateral agreements relating to trade
are normally not considered trade agreements under section
301(a) (1)(A). 1 13 The reason for this construction is that in all cases
involving trade agreements, section 303(a)(2) directs the USTR to
trigger the formal dispute settlement proceedings provided for in the
relevant agreement if the dispute could not be solved by prior consul-
tations. Because the dispute settlement procedures of some agree-
ments dealing with trade matters provide for referral to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 1 4 section 301 (a) (1) (A) of the
Trade Act of 1974 is to be construed narrowly since Congress, when
passing section 301, did not intend to require resort to the ICJ in trade
disputes."15
Some commentators suggest that the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) codes,' 16 as well as informal
or hortatory agreements,11 7 are also covered by the term "trade agree-
ment" as used in section 301 (a) (1) (A) and (B). 118 However, the word-
ing of section 302(a) (2) of the Trade Act of 1974,119 providing for the
triggering of formal dispute settlement procedures if prior consulta-
Semiconductor Accord of 1986: The Shortcomings of High Tech Protectionism, 13 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 179 (1989); William J. Long, The U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Dispute: Implications for U.S.
Trade Policy, 13 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1 (1989).
113 Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 634-35 n.4; Bello & Holmer, supra note 111, at 212
n.3; Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 362. But see the Taiwan Customs Valuation case: In 1979,
the United States and many other countries concluded the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Relating to Customs Valuation),
Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,402 [hereinafter GATT Customs Valuation Code], which is a
trade agreement for the purposes of section 301 (a) (1) (A) and (B) (i) of the Trade Act of
1974. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (l) (A) and (B)(i) (1988). In the same year, Taiwan, which could
not become party to the GATT Customs Valuation Code because it is not a party to the
GATT, in an agreement with the United States (effected by an exchange of letters), agreed to
observe obligations "substantially the same" as those applicable to developing countries
under the GATT Customs Valuation Code. In a determination the USTR made on August 1,
1986, the President stated that Taiwan, by not having implemented the bilateral agreement
with the United States, had "violate[d] a trade agreement." 51 Fed. Reg. 28,219 (1986).
Though a bilateral agreement was violated, the USTR applied section 301 (a) (1) (A) of the
Trade Act of 1974. This is no exception to the USTR's narrow interpretation of that norm
since Taiwan, by violating the bilateral agreement with the United States, at the same time,
violated the GATT Customs Valuation Code to which the bilateral agreement referred and
which de facto defined Taiwan's obligations under the bilateral agreement. Bello & Holmer,
supra note 36, at 638, 655.
114 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan,
art. XXIV, para. 2, 4 U.S.T. 2063; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 28,
1956, U.S.-Korea, art. XXIV, para. 2, 8 U.S.T. 2217; Convention of Establishment, Nov. 25,
1959, U.S.-Fr., art. XVI. para. 2, 11 U.S.T. 2398.
115 Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 634-35 n.4; Bello & Holmer, supra note 111, at 212
n.3.
116 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 596. E.g., ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DECLARATION OF 21sT JUNE 1976 ON INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT AND MULTINATIONAL ETrrERPISES, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 967 (1976). See generally Daniel
J. Plaine, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 11 INT'L LAw. 339 (1977).
117 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 596.
118 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1) (A) and (B)(i) (1988).
119 Id. § 2413(a)(2) (1988).
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tions do not lead to a mutually acceptable solution, does not support
such a broad interpretation of the term "trade agreement." It can be
supposed that Congress, when passing section 303(a) (2), assumed that
every trade agreement covered by section 301 provided for formal dis-
pute settlement proceedings. Otherwise, Congress would have proba-
bly adopted a different, more restrictive wording comparable to that
used in section 303(a) (2) (A) dealing with consultations under a trade
agreement. 120 In the case of consultations, Congress must have been
aware of the fact that not all trade agreements provided for a specified
consultation period since it included the reservation "if any."12' As
Congress omitted such a restriction when dealing with formal dispute
settlement procedures, OECD codes and informal and hortatory
agreements should not be considered as falling within section
301 (a) (1) (A) and (B) (i) of the Trade Act of 1974, because both fail to
provide for formal dispute settlement procedures.
This very restrictive interpretation of the term "trade agreement"
has also been reflected in the practice of the USTR who does not con-
sider FCN-treaties, other bilateral agreements relating to trade, OECD
codes, and informal or hortatory agreements to be trade agreements
for the purposes of section 301 (a) (1) (A) and (B) (i). 122
ii. Denial of Rights
The foreign trade practice is, only actionable under section
301 (a) (1) (A) of the Trade Act of 1974 if the USTR finds a denial of
U.S. rights under a trade agreement (i.e., a plain violation of an inter-
national agreement).123 Contrary to actions against merely "unjustifi-
able" foreign acts,' 24 actions under section 301 (a) (1) (A) do not
require. a demonstration of a burden .or restriction on U.S. com-
merce, 125 because "a per se violation of the GATT .... is presumed.to
cause harm." 126
b. Denial of Benefits of the United States Under a Trade
Agreement
Another basis for a section 301 action arises when a foreign coun-
try denies benefits under a trade agreement to the United States.' 27
Like section 301 (a) (1) (A),' 28 section 301 (a) (1) (B) (i) of the Trade Act
120 Id. § 2413(a)(2)(A).
121 Jd
122 Id. The only exception was the Taiwan Customs Valuation case. See supra note 113
for a description of this case.
123 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(A) (1988).
124 1& § 2411(a) (1) (B) (ii) (1988).
125 Id. § 2411(a) (1) (A) and (B)(i) (1988).
126 Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Section 301 Recent Developments and Proposed Amend-
ments, 35 FED. B. NEWS &J. 68, 69 (1988)..
127 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(i).
128 Id, § 2411(a)(1)(A).
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of 1974129 is limited to "trade agreements." The narrow interpretation
of this term is the same in both cases.130 The only difference between
the two bases of action is that the notion of "denial of benefits" is
broader than the term "denial of rights." Though both coincide to a
certain extent, the former also covers cases in which a foreign govern-
ment does not violate a trade agreement but only nullifies or impairs
concessions through economic measures which undermine the equiva-
lence of the mutually granted trade concessions.' 13
c. Unjustifiable Foreign Trade Practices
The last cause of action under section 301 (a) of the Trade Act of
1974 concerns the protection of U.S. exports against "unjustifiable"
foreign trade practices which burden or restrict U.S. commerce. 132
i. Unjustifiability
The first prerequisite for an action under section 301 (a) (1) (B) (ii)
of the Trade Act of 1974 is that the foreign practice in question is
unjustifiable, 133 or more specifically, that the practice is "in violation
of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United
States." 134 The Trade Act of .1974 also explicitly names three such Un-
justifiable foreign practices: (1) the denial of most-favored-nation
treatment; (2) denial of the right of establishment; and (3) denial of
protection of intellectual property rights.' 3 5 As section 301(d) (4) (A)
of the Trade Act of 1974 refers to "the international legal rights of the
United States,"' 36 an action under this subsection can be based on the
breach of an agreement other than a "trade agreement" (e.g., one of
the numerous bilateral FCN-treaties). 137
Some authors suggest that the meaning of "unjustifiable" is still
broader, "embracing conduct which violates the spirit, if not the letter,
of binding international agreements." 138 Retaliation against measures
which do not violate the letter of a treaty but which are contrary to its
spirit is not unknown to the international trade order. GATiT's Article
XXIII(2) explicitly addresses such nonviolation nullification and im-
pairment measures,13 9 and section 301 (a) (1) (B) (i) of the Trade Act of
1974 allows retaliation against them in cases where "trade agreements"
129 I& § 2411(a)(1)(B)(i).
13o See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
131 Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 638; Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 363.
132 Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 638; Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 363.
133 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1) (B) (ii) (1988).
154 Id. § 2411(d)(4)(A) (1988).
13 Id. § 2411(d)(4)(B) (1988).
136 Id § 2411(d) (4) (A).
137 Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 640; Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 363.
138 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 597. See also Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 363.
139 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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are involved.' 4 0 Therefore, it is arguable that Congress, given its gen-
eral intention to grant the Executive broad retaliatory authority, 141
also wanted to provide for retaliatory authority in cases of the nonviola-
tion nullification and impairment of "normal" bilateral treaties (i.e.,
treaties not constituting "trade agreements").
Moreover, some commentators argue that international declara-
tions, resolutions, UNCTAD14 2 and OECD codes, and other "soft law"
can also be invoked under section 301 (a) (1) (B) (ii) of the Trade Act of
1974143 in order to challenge "unfair but technically legal conduct."1 44
However, this interpretation is not covered by the definition of "unjus-
tifiable" given in section 301(d) (4) (A) of the Trade Act of 1974 be-
cause only practices violating the "international legal rights"145 of the
United States are actionable. Though technically, UNCTAD and
OECD codes, and other "soft law" rules are not legally binding, t 46 they
constitute relatively loose commitments, which states should not be al-
lowed to disregard. 147 However, these commitments only have a moral
or political nature148 because the parties to such a nonbinding, "soft"
agreement exclude any legal responsibility in case of a breach of that
agreement.149 Therefore, "soft" rules might contribute to the creation
of new (customary) international norms, but they do not grant "rights"
to anyone. Thus, acts and practices contrary to "soft law" do not vio-
late the "international legal rights" of the United States and are not
actionable under section 301 (a) (1) (B) (ii) of the Trade Act of 1974.150
ii. Injury
In order to be actionable, unjustifiable acts have to "bur-
den[ ] or restrict[ ] United States commerce."' 51 Though the section
301 injury test is less stringent than that of other U.S. trade
laws that demand substantial, 5 2  serious, 53  or material' 54  in-
140 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B) (i) (1988).
141 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 597-98.
142 UNCTAD stands for the "United Nations Conference on Trade and Development."
143 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
144 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 597. See also Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 363.
145 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d) (4) (A) (1988) (emphasis added).
146 See generally Richard Schwartz, Are the OECD and UNCTAD Codes Legally Binding?, 11
INT'L LAw. 529 (1977).
147 Ignaz SeidI-Hohenveldern, International Economic "Soft Law" 163 RECUEIL DES COURS
D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 165, 205 (1980).
148 Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 Am. J.
INT'L L. 296, 303 (1977); see also Michel Virally, La Deuxime Dicennie des Nations Unies pour le
Diveloppement. Essai d'Interprtation Para-Juridique, 16 ANNUAiRE FRAN.a1S Dr DRorr INTERNA-
TIONAL 9, 28 (1970).
149 Schachter, supra note 148, at 300.
150 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B) (ii) (1988).
151 J&
152 Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 speaks of "[ u ] nfair methods of competition...
the.., effect of which is to ... substantially injure an industry in the United States." 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a) (1) (A) (i) (1988) (emphasis added).
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jury, 155 the showing of injury is not pro forma; de minimis allegations
will not prevail. 156 This was clearly shown in two cases where the USTR
discontinued an investigation because of an insufficient substantiation
for the claim that an allegedly unfair foreign trade practice burdened
U.S. commerce. 157 In another case, the USTR refused to initiate a sec-
tion 301 investigation for the same reason.158
d. Exceptions to Mandatory Retaliation
Contrary to prior law where retaliation was completely discretion-
ary, under the 1988 amendments to the Trade Act of 1974, the USTR
must retaliate if he finds a foreign trade practice actionable under sec-
tion 301 (a) (1) of the Trade Act of 1974.159 Section 301 (a) (2) ,160 how-
ever, provides for important exceptions to the general requirement of
mandatory retaliation.1 6 1 The USTR does not need to take action: (1)
if the United States receives an unfavorable determination in a GATT
or another formal dispute settlement procedure;-162 (2) if the foreign
country is taking steps in order to terminate its unfair trade practice; 163
or (3) if it provides compensatory trade benefits to the United
States.' 64 Moreover, "the USTR can refrain from action if retaliation
would cause serious harm to the national security of the United
States"165 or if it would have an adverse impact on the American econ-
omy (i.e., the national economic interest waiver exemption).166 All
these exceptions, but notably the national economic interest waiver ex-
emption, give the USTR a certain amount of discretion enabling him
153 Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 requires "a substantial cause of serious injury."
19 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
154 The countervailing duty and anti-dumping statutes require that "an industry in the
United States . . . is materially injured." 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)(A)(i) (1988) (emphasis
added).
155 Ashman, supra note 60, at 127-28; Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 601-02; Kevin
C. Kennedy, Presidential Authority under Section 337, Section 301, and the Escape Clause: The Case
for Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127, 134 n.55 (1987); Nettesheim, supra note 32, at
364; Thatcher, supra note 33, at 502-03.
156 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 602; Thatcher, supra'note 33, at 502-03.
157 In American Iron Steel Institute, EC and Japan Diversion of Steel to U.S., 43 Fed.
Reg. 3,962 (1978), the USTR found there was "not sufficient justification to the claim that
the EC/Japanese understanding created any unfair burden on the United States." Id. In
Indonesia Pencil Slat, 58 Fed. Reg. 610 (1993), the USTR found that "there [was] no basis for
concluding that [the alleged practices were] burdening or restricting United States com-
merce." Id. at 612. See also Kennedy, supra note 155, at 142-43.
158 In Roses, Inc., 50 Fed. Reg. 40,250 (1985), the USTR stated that "the petition did not,
with respect to several allegations, adequately demonstrate the burden to U.S. commerce."
Id.
159 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1988).
160 Id. § 2411(a)(2) (1988).
161 IMPORT TRADE LAw, supra note 36, § 42.05.
162 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (2) (A).
163 Id. § 2411(a) (2) (B) (i) and (ii) (1988).
164 Id. § 2411(a) (2) (B) (iii) (1988).
165 Id. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(v) (1988).
166 Id. § 2411(a) (2) (B) (iv) (1988).
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to avoid mandatory retaliation.1 67 However, given Congress' intention
to increase retaliatory activity, the USTR must be careful not to use
these exceptions too often.'6
3. Discretionary Action
Mandatory action is not required if the USTR determines that "an
act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or discrimi-
natory."169 In both cases, such foreign trade practices must burden or
restrict U.S. commerce. 170
a. Unreasonable Acts
The first category of foreign unfair trade practices allowing discre-
tionary action comprises all so-called "unreasonable" acts. The Trade
Act of 1974 contains both a general definition of "unreasonable" for-
eign trade practices171 and an illustrative list of specified practices
which are considered to be per se "unreasonable." 172
i. The General Definition of "Unreasonable"
The general definition of the term "unreasonable" given by the
Trade Act of 1974 is extremely broad and vague. It includes any "act,
policy, or practice [which], while not necessarily in violation of, or in-
consistent with, the international legal rights of the United States, is
otherwise unfair and inequitable.""73 In the past, several commenta-
tors have tried to develop criteria for the unreasonableness determina-
tion. Hudec was the first to address the issue. After having carefully
analyzed the drafting history of "unreasonable," he came to the conclu-
sion that "the normative content of the word 'unreasonable' . . . can-
not be defined" 74 and that it would "be interpreted to cover any trade
impediment that exporters find annoying.""15 Fisher and Steinhardt
wanted to proscribe all "conduct which is . . . in bad faith." 176 This
interpretation should enable the President, 77 when deciding on retali-
atory action, to take into account and to balance the pros and cons of a
167 Ashman, supra note 60, at'140-41.
168 Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 365, n.82. The national economic interest waiver is
"intended [by Congress] to be an exceptional, not routine, procedure." H.R. REP. No. 40,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 62 (1987). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 559-60 (1987) ("standard of 'impossibility' is a high one" when allowing exception to
foreign country when it is impossible for foreign country to end unfair trade practice).
169 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1988).
170 Id.
171 Id. § 2411(d)(3)(A) (1988).
172 Id. § 2411(d)(3)(B) (1988).
173 Id. § 2411(d)(3) (A).
174 Robert E. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New
Section 301 and GATT Nul4/lcation and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 461, 521 (1974).
175 Id
176 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 598.
177 At that time (1982), it was still the President who determined whether a foreign prac-
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foreign trade practice as well as the political and economic conse-
quences of U.S. retaliation under section 301.178 However, this ex-
tremely general approach is not very helpful in formulating precise
standards for deciding whether or not a foreign trade practice is
"unreasonable."
Though USTR decisions under section 301(b)(1) of the Trade
Act of 1974179 are generally not based upon any set criteria, °80 an anal-
ysis of recent cases where "general" unreasonableness' 81 was invoked
shows that the most important element in an unreasonableness deter-
mination is the finding of a lack of reciprocity.' 8 2 Under this ap-
proach, a foreign trade practice is considered to be unreasonable if
there is no "substantial equivalence between the market share held by
American exporters in a certain good or service in a foreign country
and the market share held by exporters for that country in the United
States market."18 3 In the Japan Semiconductors case, for instance, the
USTR initiated an investigation because of an alleged lack of reciproc-
ity in terms of market shares.18 4 The dispute was finally settled by an
agreement aiming at the increase of the share held by- American firms
in the Japanese semiconductor market.' 8 5
Moreover, the importance of the concept of reciprocity for any
unreasonableness determination is stressed by two other factors. First,
section 301 (d) (3) (D) of the Trade Act of 1974 explicitly mentions the
principle of reciprocity when it states that "[f] or purposes of determin-
ing whether any act, policy, or practice is unreasonable, reciprocal op-
portunities in the United States for foreign nationals and firms shall be
taken into account."186 Second, not only was the concept of reciproc-
ity one of the most important issues in the discussions leading to the
tice was actionable under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. In 1988, the authority was
transferred to the USTR. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a),and (b) (1988).
178 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 598.
179 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1988).
180 Pedley, supra note 44, at 291.
181 This excludes the per se unreasonable practices enumerated in section 301 (d) (3) (B)
of the Trade Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d)(3)(B) (1988).
182 Patricia I. Hansen, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, 96 YA L.J. 1122, 1142 (1987). See also Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 401
("The fundamental notion behind the 'unreasonable' standard is reciprocity.").
183 See Thatcher, supra note 33, at 504.
184 Japan Semiconductors case, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,866 (1985). The petitioner, the Semi-
conductor Industry Association, alleged that the U.S. semiconductor industry held only
11.4% of the Japanese semiconductor market while the Japanese share in the U.S. market
was much higher. Id.
185 Arrangement Concerning Trade in Semiconductors, Sept. 2, 1986, U.S.-Japan, 25
I.L.M. 1409 (1986). See supra note 112 for a discussion of this agreement.
186 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(D) (1988) (emphasis added). In the European Space
Agency Satellite Launching Services case, No. 301-46, 49 Fed. Reg. 28,643 (1984), the Presi-
dent determined that the commercial satellite launching practices of the European Space
Agency were "not sufficiently different from U.S. practice in this field as to be considered
unreasonable under Section 301." 50 Fed. Reg. 29,631 '(1985).
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passing of the 1979, 1984, and the 1988 amendments, 8 7 "reciprocal
market access" is one of the overall trade negotiating objectives set
forth in section 1101(a)(1) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988.188
Despite all of this, the standard of fairness and equity established
in section 301(d)(3)(A) of the Trade Act of 1974 "remains virtually
undefined" 189 and contains nearly no restriction on what the USTR
may consider "unreasonable." 190 This lack of a clear standard allows
the United States to impose its sometimes arbitrary'91 standards of fair-
ness in international trade on the rest of the world. 192
ii. Specific Unreasonable Practices
Section 301 (d) (3) (B) of the Trade Act of 1974 enumerates several
trade practices which are supposed to be per se "unreasonable." These
include the denial of "fair and equitable opportunities for the estab-
lishment of an enterprise,"' 9 3 the denial of "adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights,"194 and the denial of "market
opportunities, including the toleration of systematic anticompetitive
activities by . . . or among private firms."195 Moreover, section
301(d) (3)(B) includes export targeting' 96 and the denial of certain
worker rights such as the right of association as actions which are un-
reasonable per se. 197
b. Discriminatory Acts
Foreign trade practices discriminating against U.S. firms can form
another basis for discretionary action under section 301 (b) (1) of the
187 See Hansen, supra note 182, at 1146 n.90. See also Helen Milner, The Political Economy
of U.S. Trade Policy: A Study of the Super 301 Provision, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S
301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 163, 169 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T.
Patrick eds., 1990); R. Michael Gadbaw, Reciprocity and Its Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, 14
LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 691 (1982).
188 19 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1) (emphasis added).
189 Jeanne S. Archibald, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, in MANUAL FOR THE PRACTICE
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw, at VII-12 (William K Ince & Leslie A. Glick eds., 1984).
190 Hansen, supra note 182, at 1133; Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301:
Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE
WORIL TRADING SYSTEM 113, 123 (agdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
191 Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 365.
192 Id. at 365-66; Marjorie Minkler, The Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, Section 301: A Permissi-
ble Enforcement Mechanism or a Violation of the United States' Obligations under International Law?,
11J.L. & COM. 283, 300 (1992).
193 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (1988).
194 Id. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(II).
195 Id. § 2411(d) (3) (B) (i) (III).
196 Id § 2411(d) (3) (B) (ii). See also Gregory T. Nojeim, Foreign Industrial Targeting: Sec-
tion 301 and the Trade Act of 1974 as a Remedy, 25 VA.J. INT'L L. 483 (1985).
197 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d) (3) (B) (iii) (1988). See generally Harlan Mandel, In Pursuit of the
Missing Link: International Worker Rights and International Trade?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
443 (1989); Theresa A. Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation and
the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 79 (1990).
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Trade Act of 1974. Under the Act, discriminatory trade practices are
defined to include "any act, policy, [or] practice which denies national
or most-favored-nation treatment to United States goods, services, or
investment."' 98 Discriminatory practices which are contrary to the
GATT, contrary to another trade agreement, or "unjustifiable" (i.e.,
inconsistent with the international legal rights of the United States)
are exclusively covered by section 301 (a) (1) of the Trade Act of
1974.199 In these cases, retaliation is not discretionary but
mandatory.200 The provisions prescribing mandatory retaliation would
otherwise be undermined.20 1
c. Injury
An unreasonable or discriminatory trade practice is only actiona-
ble under section 301 (b) (1) of the Trade Act of 1974 if it "burdens or
restricts United States commerce." 20 2 This injury requirement is the
same as that contained in section 301 (a) (1) (B) (ii).203
4. Retaliatory Authority
Whenever a foreign trade practice is actionable under section
301 (a) or (b), section 301(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the
USTR to: (1) "suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, bene-
fits of trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade agreement with
the foreign country";204 (2) impose duties or other import restrictions
on the goods and services of the foreign country;205 or (3) enter into a
binding agreement with the foreign country committing this country
to eliminate, or phase out the unfair practice, 20 6 eliminate the burden
on U.S. commerce, 207 or provide satisfactory compensation for the
burdened U.S. economic sector.208 Moreover, in cases where the
USTR wants to retaliate against the foreign service industry, he is
entitled to restrict the terms and conditions of any service sector access
authorization, 20 9  or to "deny the issuance of any such
authorization."210
198 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d) (5) (1988).
199 Id. § 2411(a)(1) (1988).
200 Nettesheim, supra note 32, at 361.
201 Id. at 367.
202 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1988).
203 Id. § 2411(a) (1) (B) (ii). See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
204 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(A) (1988).
205 Id. § 2411(c)(1)(B).
206 Id. § 2411(c)(1)(C)(i).
207 Id. § 2411(c) (1) (C) (ii).
208 Id. § 2411(c) (1) (C) (iii).
209 Id. § 2411(c)(2)(A)(i).
210 Id. § 2411(c)(2)(A)(ii).
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C. Judicial Review of Section 301 Actions
Because section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 contains no provi-
sion concerning the judicial review of unfairness determinations made
by the USTR, commentators have not yet been able to reach a consen-
sus on whether or not courts can review the USTR's decisions.2 11
Thus, it is interesting to examine whether, for instance, a petitioner
can attack the final determination of the USTR under section
304(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974212 to dispute whether a certain
foreign trade practice is not unfair.
1. Lack ofJudicial Review Provisions in Section 301
Some commentators, suggesting that unfairness determinations
made by the USTR under section 301 are not subject to judicial review,
argue that unlike the anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws, 213
section 301 does not contain provisions explicitly providing for judicial
review.2 14 Therefore, Congress did not want section 301 determina-
tions to be reviewed by the courts. 215 However, the fact that section
301 is silent with respect to judicial review does not per se mean that
unfairness determinations cannot be attacked before the courts.216 In
the context of a section 201 "escape" clause action, court have dealt
with the question as to whether presidential decisions in international
trade controversies can be reviewed by the courts, despite the fact that
section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974217 does not explicitly grant judi-
cial review.2 18 Even though the court put an' extreme limitation on
judicial review, 219 and gave nearly unlimited discretion to the Presi-
dent,2 20 it also found circumstances in which courts are allowed to in-
tervene.22 1 Therefore, the silence of section 301 with regard to judicial
211 Some commentators do not favor judicial review. See, e.g., Bello & Holmer, supra
note 126, at 69; Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 647; Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at
578; Hudec, supra note 174, at 122 n.13; Mandel, supra note 197, at 468; Elisabeth Zoller,
Remedies for Unfair Trade: European and United States Views, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 227, 234
(1985). Contra Erwin P. Eichmann & Gary N. Horlick, Political Questions in International Trade:
Judicial Review of Section 301?, 10 MICH.J. INT'L L. 735, 752 (1989); Fred H.Jones, Comment,
U.S. Tobacco Goes Abroad: Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act as a Toolfor Achieving Access to Foreign
Tobacco Markets, 14 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 439, 453 (1989).
212 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1) (1988).
213 Id, § 1516a (containing detailed provisions concerning "Uludicial review in counter-
vailing duty and antidumping duty proceedings").
214 Bello & Holmer, supra note 126, at 69; Jones, supra note 211, at 453.
215 DitK PETERMANN, BESCHRANKUNGEN ZUR ABWEHR VON BESCHRANKUNGEN 119 (1989).
216 Eichmann & Horlick, supra note 211, at 752.
217 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988).
218 Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
219 "In international trade controversies... involving the President ... this court and its
predecessors have often reiterated the very limited role of reviewing courts." Id. at 89.
220 "[T] he President's findings of fact and the motivations for his action are not subject
to review." Id. (quoting Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
221 "For a court to interpose, there has to be a clear misconstruction of the governing
statute, a significant procedural violation, or action outside delegated authority." Id.
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review alone does not hinder the courts from taking up the case. 222
2. The Political Question Doctrine
However, the so-called political question doctrine could be a seri-
ous obstacle to judicial review of USTR decisions under section 301
since these decisions nearly always involve political considerations.
Though courts are normally very hesitant in reviewing decisions of the
Executive involving foreign affairs, "it- is error to suppose that every
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance." 223 Consequently, among commentators, there is much
disagreement on the exact scope of the political question doctrine. 22 4
Nevertheless, a six-prong test developed by Justice Brennan in Baker v.
CarY225 is considered to be the "now-classic catalogue of conditions to
which the political question doctrine applies."226 According to Bren-
nan's test, a dispute falling within one or more of the following catego-
ties is regarded to be political and therefore not reviewable by the
courts:
2 2 7
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack ofjudicially discovera-
ble and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due co-
ordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question. 22
8
As the first category is not relevant in this context,229 only the re-
maining five criteria have to be dealt with. These can be broken down
into two groups. Factors two and three concern the ability of the judi-
ciary to resolve the question; factors four to six deal with the possible
embarrassment of the Executive by court decisions.230
222 Eichmann & Horlick, supra note 211, at 752. But see Duracell, Inc. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578, 1580 (Fed! Cir. 1985) (denyingjudicial review, of a presi-
dential action because "n]othing in section 337(g) or elsewhere in the statute [i.e., the Tariff
Act of 1930] provides a litigant with a right of review of the President's decision per se").
225 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
224 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUFSTIONS/JUDIcIAL ANSWERS: DoEs THE
RuLE OF LAw APPLY To FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992).
225 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211.
226 Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 339 (D.D.C. 1987).
227 Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, in FOREIGN AF.
FAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTrrUTION 107, 107 (Louis Henkin et al. eds, 1990).
228 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
229 Eichmann & Horlick, supra note 211, at 746 n.53 (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
(Congress shall "regulate commerce with foreign nations")).
230 Id. at 746. The same simplified approach is used in Ramirez de Arellano v. Wein-
berger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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a. Justiciability
Under the Brennan test, a dispute isjusticiable if a court can find
"discoverable and manageable standards" with which to analyze the
question. 23 1 Section 301 grants the USTR retaliatory authority in dif-
ferent cases. Thus, each of them must be examined separately.
i. Violation of a Trade Agreement
Under sections 301(a)(1)(A) and (B)(i) of the Trade Act of
1974,232 the USTR has to retaliate if a trade agreement is violated, or if
a nonviolation nullification and impairment of a trade agreement will
result. As the term "trade agreement" is interpreted to include only
the GATT and certain MTN-treaties, 233 and since the GATT is a "legal-
istic treaty,"23 4 courts should not have problems construing "trade
agreements" and deciding on their violation or impairment by foreign
trade practices. 23 5 This assumption is proved by the fact that, in sev-
eral cases, U.S. courts already interpreted and applied the GATT with-
out having difficulties in finding 'judicially discoverable and
manageable standards." 23 6
ii. Unjustifiable Foreign Trade Practices
An unjustifiable act is defined as being "in violation of, or incon-
sistent with, the international legal rights of the United States."23 7
Most of the cases under section 301 where an "unjustifiable" foreign
trade practice was invoked involved the alleged violation of bilateral
treaties relating to trade (mostly FCN treaties) or the denial of most-
favored-nation treatment. Here again, courts only have to deal with
legal problems similar to those arising under the GATT.23 8 As, at least
in the past, U.S. courts proved to master these legal problems success-
fully,239 "unjustifiable" foreign acts are also clearly justiciable. 240
iii. Unreasonable Foreign Trade Practices
As discussed above, the definition of "unreasonable" foreign trade
231 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
232 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1) (A) and (B)(i) (1988).
233 See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
234 Eichmann & Horlick, supra note 211, at 748.
235 Id,
236 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 458 (1978); United States
v. Star Indus., Inc., 462 F.2d 557, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); Sneaker Circus, Inc. v.
Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1290 (1979).
237 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d) (4) (A) (1988).
238 Eichmann & Horlick, supra note 211, at 749.
239 See, e.g., John T. Bill Co. v. United States, 104 F.2d 67 (C.C.P.A. 1939) (The U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals interpreted the U.S.-Germany FCN treaty and voided a
50% tariff as inconsistent with the FCN treaty.).
240 Eichmann & Horlick, supra note 211, at 749-50.
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practices in the Trade Act of 1974241 is extremely broad and vague.242
One commentator even came to the conclusion that "the normative
content of the word 'unreasonable' ... cannot be defined."243 Due to
this lack of "judicially discoverable and manageable standards," "unrea-
sonable" trade practices are not justiciable.244
As demonstrated by the above analysis, actions under sections
301 (a) (1) (A) and (B), 245 dealing with the violation or the nonviola-
tion nullification and impairment of a trade agreement as well as with
unjustifiable foreign trade practices, are justiciable while actions under
section 301(b) 2 4 6 against merely unreasonable foreign acts are not
justiciable.
b. Embarrassment
However, under the Brennan test certain questions, though gen-
erally justiciable and ripe for decision, may not be reviewed by. the
courts because of possible embarrassment to the Executive Branch. 247
In the context of an investigation under section 301 (a) (1) of the
Trade Act of 1974,248 a distinction has to be made between two scena-
rios where the courts could possibly intervene. The first scenario in-
volves the situation where, in his final determination under section
304(a) (1) of the Trade Act of 1974,249 the USTR found no unfair for-
eign trade practice 250 or terminated the investigation which was initi-
ated by a private petitioner for other reasons (i.e., negative final
determination). Since relief was denied by the USTR, the petitioner
may desire to challenge this negative final determination before the
courts.25 1 In the second scenario, the USTR determined that the for-
eign practice investigated was unfair (i.e., positive final determination)
and takes retaliatory action pursuant to section 301 (c) of the Trade Act
of 1974.252 The importers of foreign products which are affected, or
which will be affected, by the retaliation (e.g., by higher duties) may
want to attack the action in the courts.253
241 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3) (1988).
242 See supra notes 173-92 and accompanying text.
243 Hudec, supra note 174, at 521.
244 Contra Eichmann & Horlick, supra note 211, at 750-54.
245 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1988).
246 I. § 2411(b)(1) (1988).
247 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
248 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1988).
249 IM/ § 2413(a)(1) (1988).
250 In the following, "unfair trade practice" only means a trade practice actionable under
section 301(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1988). As shown in
supra notes 232-40 and accompanying text, such an unfair trade practice meets the
judiciability requirements under the Brennan test.
251 An unsuccessful petitioner would have standing as he has been injured by the lack of
relief. Eichmann & Horlick, supra note 211, at 756.
252 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1988).
253 These persons would have standing. Eichmann & Horlick, supra note 211, at 756.
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i. Negative Final Determination
Even if the USTR finds no unfair foreign trade practice, the final
determination is always preceded by consultations and negotiations
with the foreign government concerned.2 54 In many of the section 301
investigation cases, the foreign country agrees to change its allegedly
unfair trade practice after consultations with the United States, which
in exchange terminates the section 301 investigation. 255 If petitioners,
who are not satisfied with the changed foreign practice and who still
think this practice to be unfair, can attack the termination of investiga-
tions before the courts, the Executive Branch would be extremely em-
barrassed. Even though the foreign country changed its practice
relying on the U.S. "promise" to end the section 301 investigation, it
would still be exposed to a section 301 investigation restarted pursuant
to a court decision. Such situations would cast doubt upon the credi-
bility of the U.S. government in consultations and negotiations with
foreign governments. Therefore, the judicial review of negative deter-
minations made by the USTR could -severely compromise the Execu-
tive Branch. 256
it. Positive Final Determination
In most cases where the USTR makes a positive final determina-
tion, retaliatory action (or even only the threat of it) leads to new ne-
gotiations with the foreign country concerned which probably will
make concessions. 25 7 If, in such a situation, the USTR's positive final
determination is challenged before the court and voided, the credibil-
ity of the USTR during future negotiations would be compromised. In
254 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(1) (1988).
255 See, e.g., Thailand Enforcement of Copyright Protection, 56 Fed. Reg. 292 (1991)
(USTR terminated an investigation after the Thai government began to implement measures
to eliminate its allegedly unfair trade practices); Denial of Benefits Under a Trade Agree-
ment by the European Community, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,197 (1990) (USTR terminated an investi-
gation after a settlement with the EC was reached); Procurement of Electronic Highway Toll
Identification Systems by the Government of Norway, 54 Fed. Reg. 36,089 (1989) (USTR
terminated an investigation after the Norwegian government agreed to end its procurement
practices which violated the GATT procurement code); Thailand's Restrictions on Access to
Its Cigarette Market, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,724 (1989) (USTR terminated an investigation after the
Thai government promised to end import restrictions which violated the GATT).
256 Contra Eichmann & Horlick, supra note 211, at 755.
257 See, e.g., Canada Restrictions Affecting the Importation of Beer, 55 Fed. Reg. 27,731
(1990) (USTR made a positive final unfairness determination on December 29, 1991 and
imposed higher duties on beer from Canada sufficient to offset fully the nullification and
impairment of GATT rights resulting from the unfair Canadian trade practices. In August
1993, the USTR terminated the retaliatory duties after an agreement with Canada was
reached improving the access for U.S. beer into the Canadian market.); Semiconductor In-
dustry Association, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,866 (1985) (President imposed higher duties on certain
Japanese electronic products on April 17, 1987 because ofJapanese non-compliance with the
U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement of September 2, 1986. As a result of Japan's im-
proved compliance with the agreement the USTR suspended the increased duties in June
1987.). See also Retaliation under Section 301, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Import Reference Man-
ual, 49:0114-0115 (Nov. 24, 1993).
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addition, the threatening effect of positive determinations would be at
least partly removed. 258
Therefore, both negative and positive final determinations should
not be subject to judicial review as this could severely embarrass the
Executive Branch and undermine its credibility.in trade negotiations
with foreign, countries.
III. Council Regulation 2641/84
In 1984, partly in response to the enactment of section 301 of the
Trade Act-of 1974 by the United States,259 the Council of the Euro-
pean Communities adopted Council Regulation 2641/84260 in order
to "defend vigorously the legitimate interests of the Community in the
appropriate bodies, in particular GATT, and to make sure the Commu-
nity . . . acts with as much speed and efficiency as its trading
partners."261
A. Procedural Law of Council Regulation 2641/84
The Commission, when initiating an examination procedure
under Council Regulation 2641/84, can have two objectives: (1) it can
aim at responding to an illicit foreign commercial practice in order to
remove the injury caused by this practice to a "Community indus-
try";262 or (2) it can aim at ensuring the full exercise of the Union's
rights with regard to the commercial practices of other countries. 263
Such an examination procedure can consist of up to five different
.stages: (1) initiation of an examination procedure; 264 (2) consulta-
tions with the foreign government(s) concerned (not mandatory);2 65
(3) public hearing and submission of written briefs and rebuttal
briefs;266 (4) report of the Commission and decisionon which further
steps to take; 2 67 and (5) the triggering of dispute settlement
procedures. 26 8
1. Initiation of an Examination Procedure
The Commission can initiate the examination proceedings pro-
vided for in Council Regulation 2641/84 in response either to a writ-
258 Contra Eichmann & Horlick, supra note 211, at 756-59.
259 Devine, supra note 33, at 1093; PETERMANN, supra note 215, at 37.
260 Council Regulation 2641/84 of 17 September 1984 on the Strengthening. of the
Common Commercial Policy with Regard in Particular to Protection Against Illicit Commer-
cial Practices, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1 [hereinafter Reg. 2641/84].
261 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at pmbl.
262 Id. at art. 1 (a).
263 ld. at art. 1 (b).
264 I& at art. 6(1).
265 Id. at art. 6(1)(b).
266 Id. at art. 6(5).
267 Id. at art. 6(9).
268 Id. at art. 10(2).
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ten complaint by a private party269 or to a request made by one of the
twelve Member States. 270
a. In Response to a Complaint by a Private Party
Any private party acting on behalf of a "Community industry" can
lodge a complaint with the Commission if it can prove that it has suf-
fered injury resulting from an illicit foreign trade practice.2 71 After the
receipt of an admissible complaint, the Commission will decide
whether the initiation of an examination procedure is "necessary in
the interest of the Community."272 However, the right of private par-
ties to ask for an examination procedure is restricted. They can only
challenge illicit foreign commercial practices (so-called "clause a" pro-
cedures). They cannot request the Commission to initiate proceedings
aimed at "ensuring the full exercise of the Community's rights with
regard to the commercial practices of third countries" (so-called
"clause b" procedures).27s This right is reserved to the Member
States.274
i. Admissible Complaint
(A) Community Industry
The first prerequisite for the admissibility of a private complaint is
that it is lodged by a natural or legal person (including an association
which does not have legal personality) acting on behalf of a "Commu-
nity industry."275 This term is defined in extenso in Article 2(4) of the
regulation. 276 Pursuant to this definition, "Community industry"
means either all Union producers or all producers whose combined
output constitutes a major proportion of the total Union production of
goods identical or similar to the product which is the subject of the
illicit foreign trade practice in question. Consumers and processors of
such goods can also form a "Community industry" for the purpose of
Council Regulation 2641/84 if they meet the above mentioned re-
quirements (e.g., they must represent all Union consumers or proces-
269 Id. at art. 3.
270 Id. at art. 4.
271 Id at art. 3(1).
272 Id. at art. 6(1).
273 Id. at art. 3(1); James R. Atwood, The European Economic Community's New Measures
Against Unfair Trade Practices in International Trade: Implications for United States Exporters, 19
INT'L LAw. 361, 364 (1985). Council Regulation 2641/84 defines "the Community's rights"
as "those international trade rights which it may avail itself under international law or under
generally accepted rules." Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 2(2).
274 Marco C.EJ. Bronckers, Private Response to Unfair Trade Practices-United States and
EEC Complaint Procedures, 6 Nw.J. Iwr'L. L. & Bus. 651, 733 (1984);Jacques H.J. Bourgeois &
P. Laurent, Le "nouvel instrument de politique commerciale. un pas en avant vers l'iimination des
obstacles aux ichanges internationaux, 21 R. TiMEs-rIELLE D. EUR. 41, 54 (1985).
275 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 3(1).
276 Id. at art. 2(4).
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sors);27 7 traders are not included in this definition of "Community
industry."278 However, this rather rigid rule allows an exception in
favor of regional industries, representing only a part of the "Commu-
nity industry." Thus, producers within one region of the Union are
also considered to represent a "Community industry" only if their com-
bined output constitutes the major output of the product in' question
in that region and the illicit foreign trade practice mainly affects this
region.2 79 This restrictive definition has been borrowed from the EU
anti-dumping and subsidizing regulations 280 which reflect the corre-
sponding provisions of the 1979 GATT Anti-Dumping code 28 1 and the
1979 GATT Subsidies and Countervailing Duty code.28 2
Up to now, complainants never had any problems establishing
that they were representing i "Community industry,"28 3 partly because
the Commission interpreted the requirement that a complainant has
to act on behalf of a "Community industry" rather generously.
284
277 J.
278 Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, EC Rules Against "Illicit Trade Practices" -Polity Cosmetics or Inter-
national Law Enforcement, 1988 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAm CORPORATE LAW INSTI-
TUTE: EUROPEAN/AMERICAN ANTrrRusT AND TRADE LAw 6-1, at 6-22 (Barry E. Hawk ed.,
1988).
279 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 2(4)(b).
280 Council Regulation 288/82, 1982 OJ. (L 35) 1; Council Regulation 2176/84, 1984
OJ. (L 201) 1. Both regulations were repealed by Council Regulation 2423/88 of July 11,
1988 on the Protection Against Dumped and Subsidized Imports from Countries not Mem-
bers of the European Economic Community, 1988 OJ. (L 209) 1.
281 SeeAgreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, art. 4(1), T.I.A.S. No. 9650, 1186 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter GATT
Anti-Dumping Code].
282 See Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, art. 6(5), T.I.A.S. No. 9619, 1186
U.N.T.S. 204 [hereinafter GATT Subsidies Code]; Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-22 to 6-23.
283 In four cases, the Commission decided to initiate an examination procedure: Akzo v.
United States, 1986 O.J. (C 25) 2, 2 (where the Commission held that the Akzo group was
"the sole producer of aramid fiber in the Community"); IFPI v. Indonesia, 1987 OJ. (L 335)
22, 22 (where the Commission stated that complainant, the association of members of the
International Federation of Phonogram and Videogram Producers (IFPI), acted "on behalf
of producers representing virtually the whole of the Community sound-recording industry");
ECSA v. Japan, 1991 OJ. (C 40) 18, 18 (where the Commission found that the European
Community Shipowners' Association (ECSA) represented "approximately some 90% of all
Community shipping lines trading to and from Japan"); IFPI v. Thailand, 1991 OJ. (C 189)
26, 26 (where the Commission again came to the conclusion that IFPI represented "irtually
all producers of sound recordings in the Community").
284 See, e.g., Akzo v. United States, 1986 O.J. (C 25) 2, where the Commission decided
that aramid fibers constituted a product distinct from other synthetic fibers. Thus, Akzo, the
only producer of aramid fibers in the Union, had no difficulties proving that it acted on
behalf of a "Community industry." If the Commission had chosen synthetic fibers as the
relevant group of products, Akzo would not have met the "Community industry" require-
ment. Notice of an initiation of an examination procedure concerningillicit commercial
practices within the meaning of Council Regulation 2641/84, consisting of the exclusion
from the U.S. market of the unlicensed importation of certain aramid fiber manufactured by
Akzo NV or its affiliated companies outside the United States. Id. at 2. See also M.I.B. Arnold
& M. C.EJ. Bronckers, The EC New Trade Policy Instrument: A Brief Review of the Application of
Regulation 2641/84, 2 LEIDEN J. Irr'L L. 96, 99 (1989).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
(B) Proof of the Existence of an Illicit Commercial
Practice
The second requirement for a complaint by a private party is that
it contains sufficient evidence to prove the existence of an allegedly
illicit foreign trade practice. 285 One of the most important questions is
whether a private complaint is admissible if it is based on the allegation
that a certain foreign commercial practice is illicit because it infringes
on international legal rules which are neither self-executing nor di-
rectly applicable. 286 Negating this question would mean that a private
petitioner could not invoke the violation of GATT provisions because
these rules, at least according to the European Court of Justice
(E.C.J.), 28 7 are neither self-executing, nor have they been incorporated
into the Union's legal order.288 However, such a standpoint is based
on a misinterpretation of the purposes and effects of Council Regula-
tion 2641/84. It is not concerned with the direct enforceability by pri-
vate individuals of benefits accruing to them under GATT or any other
non self-executing rule of international law;28 9 rather, Council Regula-
tion 2641/84 only sets out the requirements for private petitions and
therefore only deals with the prerequisites for action of the Commis-
sion and its duties under Council Regulation 2641/84.290 Moreover,
restricting private complaints to commercial practices violating self-
executing rules would limit the practical impact of Council Regulation
2641/84.291 Both the Commission, which in the Akzo case accepted a
complaint though it was based on an alleged violation of Article XX(d)
and Article 111(4) of the GATT (i.e., non-self-executing provisions), 292
285 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 3(2).
286 See Ross Denton, The New Commercial Policy Instrument and Akzo v. DuPont, 13 EUR. L.
REv. 3, 8 (1988) ;Jacques Steenbergen, The New Commercial Policy Instrument, 22 COMMON MKT.
L. REv. 421, 426 (1985); E.L.M. V6lker, The Major Instruments of the Common Commercial Policy
ofthe EEC, in PROTECrIONISM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 17, 47-48 (E.L.M. V61ker ed., 2d
ed. 1987).
287 Case 41-44/70, International Fruit Co. NV v. Commission, 1971 E.C.R. 412; Case 9/
73, Carl Schluter v._HZA L6rrach, 1973 E.C.R. 1135; Case 39/75, Douaneagent der NV
Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1975 E.C.R. 1439.
See also E.U. Petersmann, Application of GA7Tby the Court ofJustice of the European Communities,
20 COMMON MKT. L. 1Ev. 397 (1983).
288 Denton, supra note 286, at 8.
289 1&
290 See Meinhard Hilf & Reinhard Rolf, Das "Neue Instrument" der EG. Eine rechtsstaatliche
Stdrkungdergemeinsamen Handelspolitik?, 31 RECMT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 297, 310
(1985).
291 See V6lker, supra note 286, at 49 (noting that the refusal of the Court of Justice to
hold the GATT "directly effective" in Article 173 EEC cases would effectively eliminate
breaches of the 'generally accepted rules' as bases for private party complaints); Steen-
bergen, supra note 286, at 427.
292 Notice of Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning Illicit Commercial
Practices within the Meaning of Regulation (EEC) 2641/84, Consisting of the Exclusion
from the [U.S.] Market of the Unlicensed Importation of Certain Aramid Fibre Manufactured
by Akzo NV or its Affiliated Companies outside the United States, 1986 O.J. (C 25) 2. See
supra note 283.
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and the E.CJ. seem to agree with this standpoint. The E.CJ., in its
Fediol III ruling, explicitly stated that "Regulation 2641/84 entitles the
economic agents concerned to rely on the GATT provisions in the
complaint which they lodge with the Commission in order to establish
the illicit nature of the commercial practices which they consider to
have harmed them."293
(C) Proof of an Injury Resulting from the Illicit
Foreign Commercial Practice
A private petitioner must also prove that the allegedly. illicit for-
eign commercial practice caused or threatened to cause injury to a
"Community industry."294 In light of the objectives the Commission
pursued when introducing the injury requirement, the standards
which the petitioner has to meet when proving an injury to the "Com-
munity industry" are rather high. By limiting the scope of action
against illicit commercial practices at the initiative of private petition-
ers,295 the Commission wanted to'allay the concerns of certain Mem-
ber States which feared that the new commercial instrument would be
too protectionist. 296 Moreover, the Commission aimed at avoiding
costly examination proceedings where there was no prima facie gen-
eral material interest at stake.29 7 Finally, another indicator for the
strict requirements demanded for a proof of injury to a "Community
industry" can be found when comparing the injury requirement of
Council Regulation 2641/84 and that of the anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy regulation 2423/88. The latter regulation provides that an in-
jury determination is to be made "if the dumped or subsidized imports
are . . .causing or threatening to cause material injury to an estab-
lished Community industry or materially retarding the establishment of
such an industry."29 8 Regulation 2641/84, however, does not mention
the mere retardation of the establishment of a "Community industry"
and therefore, requires that there must be injury to an already estab-
lished industry.299 Therefore, this regulation makes it more difficult
for a complainant to prove an injury.30 0 For these reasons, the proof
293 Case 70/87, EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation (Fediol) v. Commis-
sion, 1989 E.C.R. 1825, 1831 [hereinafter Fediol III]. See also Arthur E. Appleton, Annotation,
European Communities - New Commercial Policy Instrument -judicial review of Commission decision -
alleged Argentine violation of GATT, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 258 (1990).
294 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 3(1). The factors that have to be considered
when proving injury are enumerated in Article 8 of Council Regulation 2641/84. Id. at art. 8.
295 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-19; Bronckers, supra note 274, at 736.
296 Meinhard Hilf, International Trade Disputes and the Individual: Private Party Involvement
in National and International Procedures Regarding Unfair Foreign Trade Practices, 41 AUSSENWIRT-
scHAFr 441, 449-50 (1986).
297 Bronckers, supra note 274, at 736.
298 Council Regulation 2423/88, 1988 O.J. (L 209) 1, at art. 4(1) (emphasis added).
299 Frank Schoneveld, The European Community Reaction to the "Illicit" Trade Practices of
Other Countries, 26J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1992, at 28; Denton, supra note 286, at 10.
300 See, e.g., the Akzo Commission decision, 1987 OJ. (L 117) 18, where the Commission
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of injury can (and must) represent a serious hurdle for private
parties.301
ii. Decision of the Commission Whether to Initiate an
Examination Procedure
After having consulted with an advisory committee (the Commit-
tee), composed of representatives of each Member State and chaired
by a representative of the Commission,30 2 the Commission will initiate
an examination procedure if "it is necessary in the interest of the Com-
munity."30 3 Though commentators agree that this term grants the
Commission discretion whether to commence investigation proceed-
ings, 30 4 they do not agree on the scope of this discretion. One com-
mentator suggests that Article 6(1) of Council Regulation 2641/84
provides for "the widest possible discretion."30 5 However, other au-
thors argue against unlimited and in favor of limited discretion. "First,
a grant of unlimited discretion [negates] the procedural safeguards
awarded to private petitioners in Regulation 2641/84."3°  Second,
when inserting the notion of "interest of the Community" in such an
early procedural phase, the Council's end was not to grant unlimited
discretion to the Commission even before the full facts of the case are
known. Rather, in the light of the E.C.J.'s Fediol I ruling,30 7 the Coun-
stated "that there [was] no present injury resulting from the ITC exclusion order" since this
"exclusion order was issued in November 1985 and actual (limited sale) commercial produc-
tion by the Community producer only started in mid-1986." Id at 20 (emphasis added).
However, the Commission was of the opinion that there was a threat of injury to the "Com-
munity industry." I. In this case, one might have equally and perhaps more coherently
argued that the ITC exclusion order only retarded the establishment of a "Community indus-
try" as, at the time the ITC order was issued, the production of the aramid fibers had not yet
started. Following this argumentation, Akzo would not have had standing under Council
Regulation 2641/84. Schoneveld, supra note 299, at 28.
301 Bronckers, supra note 274, at 736.
302 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 5(1).
303 Id. at art. 6(1).
304 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-25; Bronckers, supra note 274 at 742; Denton, supra
note 286, at 11-12.
305 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-25. Cf Denton, supra note 286, at 12 (stating that the
insertion of the notion of "Community interest" already in art. 6(1), i.e., at a very early stage
of the procedure, "emphasises [sic] the political fact that the Community will not act unless it
feels it expedient to do so").
306 Bronckers, supra note 274, at 742. Such procedural safeguards are, for instance, the
complainant's right to inspect all information made available to the Commission, Reg. 2641/
84, supra note 260, at art. 6(4)(a); his right to be informed of the principal facts and consid-
erations resulting from the examination procedure, id. at art. 6(4) (b); or his right to demand
hearings, it. at art. 6(5). Concerning the importance of these procedural safeguards in de-
termining whether the Commission's decision on the initiation of an anti-subsidy investiga-
tion was subject to judicial review, see Case 191/82, EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors'
Federation (Fediol) v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 2913, 2934 [hereinafter Fediol 1].
307 Fediol I, supra note 306, 1983 E.C.R. 2913. Fediol wanted to attack a Commission
decision not to initiate anti-subsidy proceedings before the E.C.J. Contrary to the Commis-
sion, which argued that such a complaint was not admissible, the E.C.J. declared Fediol's
complaint admissible which meant that the Commission's decision to initiate or not to initi-
ate anti-subsidy procedures was (to a certain extent) subject to judicial review. It seems as if
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cil, by granting limited discretion, wanted to preventjudicial review of
a Commission decision not to initiate an investigation. 30 8 Due to this
limited discretionary power, the Commission can only refuse to open
an examination procedure if, after weighing the possible negative
(political or economic) effects of the opening of an investigation
against the interests of the "Community industry" affected by the for-
eign trade practice, it is clearly foreseeable that important Union inter-
ests will be damaged by the initiation of an investigation. 30 9
A decision on the initiation of an examination procedure has to
be taken within 45 days after a complaint was submitted; in special
circumstances this period may be 'extended to 60 days.310 As these
time limits are provided for in the interest of the complainants, the
latter can waive them so that the Commission can- extend the time
span within which it has to decide on the initiation of an investiga-
tion. 1 t If the Commission decides to trigger an investigation, it must
announce the initiation in the Official Journal of the European
Union.31 2
b. In Response to a Request of a Member State
Under Council Regulation 2641/84 an investigation may also be
initiated in response to a request of one of the Member States.31 3 Con-
trary to private parties, Member States may lodge a complaint not only
with respect to "clause a" procedures but also with regard to "clause b"
procedures3 1 4 (i.e., they can also demand the initiation of proceedings
aimed at "ensuring full exercise of the Community's rights with regard
to the commercial practices of third countries").3 15 Depending on
which of the two procedures the Member States wants to trigger, the
requirements for the admissibility of a complaint differ.3 16
the E.CJ. had attached importance to the fact that in anti-dumping matters the 'Commission
and the Council are required to consider the "Community interest" only at the end of the
investigation when contemplating measures. When drafting Council Regulation 2641/84,
the Council wanted to avoidjudicial review of decisions concerning the initiation of an exam-
ination by inserting the notion of "Community interest" already at a very early stage of the
proceedings. The explicit granting of discretion should exclude judicial review. Bourgeois,
supra note 278, at 6-42 to 6-43.
308 Bronckers, supra note 274, at 742.
309 V61ker, supra note 286, at 47-48. Albeit the Commission has only limited discretion
when deciding on the opening of an examination procedure, it is important for private com-
plainants to contact the Commission, which in practice is willing to assist potential complain-
ants with filing complaints, before submitting a complaint. Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-24
to 6-25.
310 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 6(8).
311 See Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-26. In the Akzo and in the Soya Meal from Argen-
tina cases, the complainants agreed to an extension of the time limit from 45 to 60 days. Id.
312 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 6(1) (a).
313 Id. at art. 4(1).
314 Id. at art. 4(1). See also Atwood, supra note 273, at 364. For an explanation of these
terms, see supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
315 Devine, supra note 33, at 1104.
316 Steenbergen, supra note 286, at 423.
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If a Member State intends to lodge a complaint with respect to the
first aim of Article 1 of Council Regulation 2641/84 (i.e., with regard
to an illicit foreign commercial practice), the complaint has to meet
the same high admissibility standards as a private complaint 17 (i.e.,
the complaint has to contain sufficient evidence of the illicit foreign
commercial practice and of the injury resulting therefrom).318 Here
again, the Commission will only open an investigation if "it is necessary
in the interest of the Community."3 19
Complaints aimed at "ensuring full exercise of the Community's
rights with regard to commercial practices of third countries" 3 20 do
not require the proof of injury to a "Community industry."3 21 A Mem-
ber State is only required to submit proof of the violation or the nonvi-
olation nullification and impairment of a trade agreement between the
Union and a third state.3 22
c. Self-Initiation by the Commission
The question whether the Commission can self-initiate an investi-
gation is not explicitly addressed in Council Regulation 2641/84. One
commentator suggests that the practice under the anti-dumping and
anti-subsidy rules serves as a guideline, 32 3 since the relevant procedural
provisions of Council Regulation 2641/84 are modelled after the anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy rules.3 24 Though an anti-dumping or anti-
subsidy procedure will normally only be initiated after a complaint by a
private party was lodged,3 25 Articles 5 and 7 of Council Regulation
2423/88 do not make the receipt of a complaint an obligatory prereq-
317 Devine, supra note 33, at 1104.
318 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 4(2). See supra notes 294-301 and accompanying
text.
319 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 6(1). See supra notes 302-09 and accompanying
text.
320 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 1.
321 See, e.g., Steenbergen, supra note 286, at 433.
322 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 4(2).
323 See, e.g., Council Regulation, 2423/66, 1988 O.J. (L 209) 1; Council Regulation 288/
82, 1982 O.J. (L 35) 1; Council Regulation 2176/84, 1984 O.J. (L 201) 1. See also, Bourgeois,
supra note 278, at 6-21.
324 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-21; V61ker, supra note 286, at 50. See, e.g., the identi-
cal wording of articles 3(1) and 6(1) of Council Regulation 2641/84, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1, 2-3,
on one hand, and Articles 5(1) and 7(1) of Council Regulation 2423/88, 1988 O.J. (L 209) 1,
8-9, on the other hand.
325 Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, EC Antidumping Enforcement-Selected. Second Generation Issues,
1986 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGs OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: ANTITRUST AND
TRADE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 563, 591 (Barry E. Hawk
ed., 1986). The reason for this restrictive use of the right to self-initiate anti-dumping proce-
dures can be found in Article 5(1) of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code which provides that the
right to self-initiate an anti-dumping investigation can only be exercised in "special circum-
stances." GATT Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 281. However, it should be noted that Art.
2(3) of the GATT Anti-Subsidy Code does not limit the right of the competent authority to
self initiate anti-subsidy procedures. GAIT Subsidies Code, supra note 282.
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uisite for the initiation of an investigation.3 26 Therefore, it can be ar-
gued that because of the nearly identical wording of certain parts of
Articles 3(1) and 6(1) of Council Regulation 2641/84, on one hand,
and Articles 5(l) and 7(1) of Council Regulation 2423/88, on the
other hand,327 the Commission should also be able to self-initiate pro-
cedures under Council Regulation 2641/84.328
This argument, however, is erroneous given the differences in the
wording of the relevant parts of the anti-dumping/anti-subsidy regula-
tion, on one hand, and Council Regulation 2641/84, on the other
hand. Bourgeois only refers to Article 5(1) of Council Regulation
2423/88329 which is in fact identical with Article 3(1) of Council Regu-
lation 2641/84.330 The right of the Commission to self-initiate anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy proceedings, however, does not emanate
from Article 5 (1) of Council Regulation 2423/88 but from Article 5 (6)
of this regulation.3 3 1 There is no equivalent provision in Council Regu-
lation 2641/84. Therefore, the rules providing for the Commission's
power to self-initiate proceedings under the anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy regulation are not transferrable to cases involving retaliation
against foreign illicit commercial practices. Thus, the Commission
cannot self-initiate proceedings under Council Regulation 2641/84.332
2. Consultations with the Foreign Government Concerned
After the publication of its decision to initiate an examination pro-
cedure, the Commission officially notifies the representatives of the
foreign governments which are the subjects of the investigation. 333
326 HANS F. BESELER & NEVILLE N. WILLIAMS, ANTi-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAw: THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 176-77 (1986);Jean-FranCois Bellis, The EEC Anti-Dumping System, in
ANTIDUMPING LAw AND PRACTICE 41,47 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989);
Bourgeois, supra note 325, at 590; William J. Davey, An Analysis of European Communities Legis-
lation and Practice Relating to Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, 1983 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES OF THE EURO-
PEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 39, 82 n.167 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1983).
327 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-21. However, the author is of the opinion that if the
Commission follows its present policy in anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases it is highly un-
likely that it will self-initiate an investigation under Council Regulation 2641/84. Id. Up to
now, the Commission has not yet self-initiated anti-dumping or anti-subsidy proceedings.
However, pursuant to Article 14(1) of Council Regulation 2176/84, 1984 OJ. (L 201) 1, 13
(now Article 14 (1) of Council Regulation 2423/88, 1988 O.J. (L 209) 1, 14), the Commis-
sion self-initiated one review in the Ball Bearings from Poland and Other Countries case,
1985 O.J. (C 77) 4, 4. See also BESELER & WILLIAMS, supra note 326, at 177 n.25a.
328 See, e.g., PETERMANN, supra note 215, at 98; Hilf & Rolf, iupra note 290, at 305.
329 Council Regulation 2423/88, 1988 O.J. (L 209) 1, 1-15.
330 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 3(1); Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-21.
331 Bellis, supra note 326, at 47 n.15. Even Bourgeois himself acknowledges that in anti-
dumping or anti-subsidy cases the legal basis for the Commission's right to self-initiate pro-
ceedings is to be found in Article 5(6) of Council Regulation 2423/88. Bourgeois, supra note
325, at 590.
332 EBERHARD GRABrrz ET AL., EUROPAISCHES AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 247 n.65 (1994).
Contra PETERMANN, supra note 215, at 98; Hilf & Rolf, supra note 290, at 305.
333 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 6(1)(b).
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Council Regulation 2641/84 entitles, but does not obligate, the Com-
mission to hold consultations with the foreign government at this early
stage.3 34
3. Public Hearings and Submission of Written Briefs and
Rebuttal Briefs
Article 6(5) of Council Regulation 2641/84 provides for the possi-
bility of a hearing involving the concerned parties. The parties primar-
ily concerned have a right to a hearing if they make a timely written
request.3 3 5 Moreover, after a request, the Commission shall give the
parties primarily concerned an opportunity to meet and to exchange
their opinions. 336 No party can be forced to participate in such a
meeting, and a party's failure to attend is not prejudicial to its inter-
ests.3 37 Even if the parties primarily concerned attend the meeting,
they can withhold all information they consider to be confidential. 338
As Articles 7 and 6(4) (a) of Council Regulation 2641/84 provide for
extensive protection of confidential information, the opportunities for
the country accused to rebut the complainant's evidence can be rather
limited.339 Article 6(4) (a), however, gives the country concerned (and
all exporters, importers as well as the complainant) a right to inspect
all information made available to the Commission unless it is not rele-
vant for the protection of its interests. 340
4. Report of the Commission and Decision on Which Further
Steps to Take
When the Commission terminates an investigation, it has to sub-
mit a report to the Committee within five months of the initiation of
the proceedings unless the issues involved in the investigation are too
complex to be examined within these five months. In such a case, the
Commission has to report within seven months. 34 1 The Commission
can make three different determinations in its report: (1) it can deter-
mine that the "interests of the Community do not require any action"
and terminate the procedure; 342 (2) it can terminate the procedure if
334 Id. See also Atwood, supra note 273, at 366 (stating that consultations with the govern-
ment concerned will probably be deferred until the termination of the investigation).
35 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 5. The time limit within which a hearing can be
requested is made public in the Official Journal of the European Community. This an-
nouncement is part of the notice of initiation.
336 Id. at art. 6(6).
337 Id.
338 Atwood, supra note 273, at 366. Article 6(6) of Council Regulation 2641/84, 1984
O.J. (L 252) 1, 4, stipulates that "the Commission shall take account . . . of the need to
preserve confidentiality."
339 Atwood, supra note 273, at 366.
340 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 6(4)(a).
341 I1& at art. 6(9).
342 Id at art. 9(1).
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the foreign country concerned has taken satisfactory action;3 43 and (3)
it can recommend action. 344
Depending on which determination the Commission wants to
make, Council Regulation 2641/84 provides for two different decision
making processes: (1) the so-called "guillotine procedure";3 45 and (2)
the procedure under Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome. 346
a. The "Guillotine Procedure"
The "guillotine procedure" 347 is set out in Article 12 of Council
Regulation 2641/84 pursuant to which the Commission has to submit
a draft of the decision to the Committee which will discuss it.348 After
having considered the opinion of the Committee, the Commission
adopts a decision which is communicated to the Member States.3 49 If
the matter is not referred to the Council by one of the Member States
within ten days of communication, the Commission's decision be-
comes final. If, however, the matter is referred to the Council by one
of the Member States within these ten days, the Council, acting by a
qualified majority, can revise the decision of the Commission within
another thirty days. If no action is taken by the Council within this
thirty day period, the Commission's decision becomes effective. 350
The "guillotine procedure" is applied if the Commission wants to
terminate an investigation because, in its opinion, "the interests of the
Community do not require any action."351 The Commission also can,
but need not, proceed pursuant to Article 12 of Council Regulation
2641/84 if it has the intention to terminate an examination procedure
because of satisfactory action by the foreign country concerned.352 Fi-
nally, the "guillotine procedure" is to be used in cases where, in a
"clause a" procedure, the Commission wants to initiate formal dispute
settlement proceedings. 3 5 3
343 1d at art. 9(2)(a).
344 Id at art. 10(1) and (2).
345 See infra notes 347-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of this term.
346 See infra notes 353-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of this procedure.
347 The term "guillotine procedure" was first used in the Commission's explanatory state-
ment accompanying its draft regulation. Vorschlag einer Verordnung (EWG) des Rates zur
Stirkung der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik und insbesondere des Schutzes gegen unlautere
Handelspraktiken (von der Kommission dem Rat vorgelegt) KoM(83)87 final at 4. See also
Hilf & Rolf, supra note 290, at 307 n.104.
348 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 12.
349 Id. See also vo vAN BAEL & JE.AN-FRANrOIS BEULIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrry EEC ANTI-DUMPING AND OTHER TRADE PROTECTION
LAws 4470 (1985).
350 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 12.
351 Id. at art. 9(1); PETERMANN, supra note 215, at 102.
352 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 9(2) (a). From the use of the term "may," it can
be derived that the Commission is not required to use the procedure set out in Article 11;
thus, it can also make use of the "guillotine procedure." vAN BAEL & BELUS, supra note 349,
4470 n.33.
353 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 1l(2)(a).
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b. Procedure Under Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome
Procedures under Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome3 5 4 give a
greater say to the Member States and curtail the decision-making
power of the Commission since, in these cases, the Council, acting by a
qualified majority, must approve all decisions proposed to it by the
Commission. The Council must accept a decision within thirty days
after receiving the Commission's proposal.355 However, unlike under
the "guillotine procedure," a failure of the Council to make a decision
within this time limit does not make the Commission draft decision
final.356 The Council's approval is needed in all cases.35 7
The Commission can, but need not, proceed pursuant to Article
113 of the Treaty of Rome if it wants to terminate an investigation be-
cause of satisfactory action of the foreign country concerned. 358 How-
ever, this procedure must be followed in cases where the Commission's
actions are aimed at ensuring the full exercise of the Union's rights
("clause b" procedures) and where the Commission wants to trigger a
prior formal dispute settlement procedure under a trade agree-
ment 3 59 Moreover, Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome must be applied
where the Commission wants, and is allowed, to take immediate retalia-
tory action because a formal dispute settlement procedure is not re-
quired under international law.3 60
This complicated decision making machinery is the result of a
compromise designed to allay the concerns expressed by some Mem-
ber States. Some Member States believed that terminating examina-
tion proceedings after "voluntary" commitments were made by foreign
countries was tantamount to concluding trade agreements. Under the
EEC treaty, this power is exclusively assigned to the Council and not to
the Commission.3 61
5. Dispute Settlement Procedure
Any decision relating to the conduct or the termination of the
dispute settlement proceedings has to be taken in accordance with the
special decision making machinery set out in Article 11 of Council
Regulation 2641/84.362 If the dispute settlement procedure deals with
354 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNrY [EEC TREArY], Mar. 25,
1957, art. 113(4), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 60.
355 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, it art. 11(2)(b).
356 Id. at art. 12. See supra note 350 and accompanying text..
357 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 11(2)(b) and 11(3); EEC TREArv, supra note
354, art. 113(4), 298 U.N.T.S. at 60.
358 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 9(2)(a).
359 Id. at art. 11(3). See also vAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 349, 4475.
360 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 11 (2)(b) and 11 (3). See also VAN BAEL & BELLIS,
supra note 349, at 4475.
361 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-39; VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 349, 4465. See also
EEC TREATY, supra note 354, art. 114, 298 U.N.T.S. at 60.
362 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 11.
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an illicit foreign commercial practice ("clause a" procedure), decisions
are to be taken pursuant to the "guillotine procedure" of Article 12.363
Decisions concerning "clause b" dispute settlement proceedings are
taken by the Council under Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome.3 64
If the dispute settlement is terminated, and if the Union is enti-
tled to retaliate under international law, the Council, both in "clause
a" and "clause b" cases, will make a final decision on the retaliatory
commercial policy measures the Union decides to apply. The Commis-
sion can only propose certain measures.3 65
B. Substantive Law of Council Regulation 2641/84
1. Substantive Law Requirements for Retaliatory Action
Article 10(1) of Council Regulation 2641/84 entitles the Union to
take retaliatory action aimed at: (1) respoiding to any illicit commer-
cial practice with the aim of removing the injury resulting therefrom
("clause a" procedure); or (2) ensuring full exercise of the Union's
rights with regard to the commercial practices of third countries
("clause b" procedure).3 66 Depending on which aim the Commission
pursues, the substantive requirements are different.
a. Illicit Commercial Practices
The first substantive law requirement for a "clause a" action is that
the foreign trade practice in question is an "illicit commercial trade
practice." Pursuant to the statutory definition of illicit commercial
practice given in Article 2(1) of Council Regulation 2641/84, several
criteria have to be fulfilled. The practice must be: (1) a trade practice;
(2) attributable to a third country; (3) incompatible either with inter-
national law or with "generally accepted rules";3 67 and (4) have caused
injury to a "Community industry."3 68 Each requirement will be dis-
cussed in detail below.
i. Trade Practice
The foreign commercial practice must be a "trade practice" in the
spirit of Article 2(1) of Council Regulation 2641/84.369 The question
here is whether the term "trade practice" only encompasses trade in
goods, or whether it also includes trade in services.3 70 The legislative
history and the wording of Council Regulation 2641/84 seem to indi-
363 Id at art. 11 (2) (a).
364 I& at art. 11(3); EEC TREATv, supra note 354, aft. 113(4), 298 U.N.T.S. at 60.
365 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 11(2)(b) and 11(3); EEC TREATv, supra note
354, art. 113(4), 298 U.N.T.S. at 60. See also vAN BAEL & BELuS, supra note 349, 14475.
366 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 10(1).
367 Id. at art. 2 (1).
68 Id. at art. 2(3).
369 Id. at art. 2(1).
370 See Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-8.
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cate that it only applies to trade in goods.3 71 In its opinion on the
Commission proposal, the European Parliament stated that the "scope
of the Regulation should be extended to cover not only goods but also
services."3 72 However, during the ensuing discussions neither the
Commission nor the Council wanted to extend the scope of the regula-
tion to include trade in services. 373 Moreover, since Article 2(4) uses
the terms "producers," "consumers," and "processors"374 when defin-
ing the notion of "Community industry," it is highly unlikely that trade
in services should be included because services are neither produced
nor processed.3 75 However, in the Japan Harbor Management Fund
case, 376 dealing with the complaint of European shipping lines, the
Commission seemed to take the view that transporting cargo to and
from Japan is a "product" for the purposes of Council Regulation
2641/84, although the transport of goods is generally considered a ser-
vice.3 7 7 Given the wording of Article 2(4), this is at least a "somewhat
strained interpretation."378
ii. Attribution to a Third Country
An allegedly illicit commercial practice can only be actionable
under Council Regulation 2641/84 if it is "attributable" to a third
country.3 79 This requirement is met if the foreign government itself,
regardless whether in the form of local, state, or federal government, is
acting in an illicit manner. This action can be legislative, regulatory, or
administrative. Such a practice "of" a foreign government is always
attributable to a foreign country.38 0
However, given the difference in the wording of Article 2(1) of
Council Regulation 2641/84, on one hand, and of Article 1(b), on the
371 Id
372 Resolution of the European Parliament on the Proposal from the Commission of the
European Communities to the Council for a Regulation on the Strengthening of the Com-
mon Commercial Policy with Regard to Protection against Unfair Commercial Practices,
1983 OJ. (C 205) 1, 9.
373 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-8.
374 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 2(4).
375 GRAarrz ET AL., supra note 332, 238-39. Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-8; Hilf& Rolf,
supra note 290, at 304; Bronckers, supra note 274, at 734-35; Bourgeois & Laurent, supra note
274, at 48-49; Devine, supra note 33, at 1106; PETERMANN, supra note 215, at 73. A further
argument in favor of a limited scope application of Council Regulation 2641/84 can be
found in Council Regulation 4057-86 on Unfair Pricing Practices in Maritime Transport,
1986 OJ. (L 378) 14, dealing with maritime transport and thus, a service. This Regulation
would be superfluous if Council Regulation 2641/84 also covered trade in services. See
GRATZ ET AL., supra note 322, at 239.
376 Notice of an Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning an Illicit Commer-
cial Practice, within the Meaning of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84, Consisting of
the Imposition in Japan of a Port Charge or Fee Used for the Creation of the Harbor Man-
agement Fund, 1991 OJ. (C 40) 18.
377 Schoneveld, supra note 299, at 33.
378 Id
379 Id
380 vAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 349, 3830; Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-16.
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other hand, the term "practices attributable to third countries" 38 1 must
have a different meaning than the notion of "practices of third coun-
tries."3 82 Therefore, the scope of Article 1 (b) arguably does not only
include direct government practices (i.e., practices of third countries)
but also practices of semi-governmental bodies and of private compa-
nies that have directly or at least to a substantial degree been
prompted by the action of a third country.3 83
iii. Incompatible with International Law or with
Generally Accepted Rules
An illicit commercial practice must be incompatible either with
international law or with generally accepted rules.3 84
(A) International Law
Council Regulation 2641/84 does not clarify what is meant by "in-
ternational law." However, "international law" undoubtedly includes
the GATT and its side agreements (e.g., the Anti-Dumping code, the
Anti-Subsidy code, and the Customs Valuation code), as well as other
bilateral and multilateral agreements relating to international trade,
even if these agreements were concluded by the Member States before
the founding of the European Communities in 1957.385 Moreover,
complainants can also invoke breaches of customary. international
trade law.3 86
(B) Generally Accepted Rules
Council Regulation 2641/84 does not contain a definition of the
term "generally accepted rules." However, it seems clear that "gener-
ally accepted rules" are not the same as customary international law
since in this case these rules would have already been covered by the
term "international law." Thus, the reference to "generally accepted
rules" in Article 2(1) would have been superfluous.3 87 On the other
hand, the word "rules" implies certain legal qualities.3 88 Taking into
381 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
382 Id. at art. 1 (b) (emphasis added). Steenbergen, supra note 286, at 425 and 433; Bour-
geois, supra note 278, at'6-16.
383 Steenbergen, supra note 286, at 425; Denton, supra note 286, at 9. See, e.g., Notice of
Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning Illicit Commercial Practice within the
Meaning of Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84, Consisting of the Imposition in Japan of a Port
Charge or Fee Used for the Creation of the Harbour Management Fund, 1991 OJ. (C 40) 18,
19. In the Japan Harbor Management Fund case, an allegedly illicit practice of the Japan
Harbor Transport Association (JHTA), a body acting under the guidance of the Japanese
Ministry of Transport, was attributed to the Japanese government. Id See also Schoneveld,
supra note 299, at 19 and 24-25.
384 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 2(1).
385 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-9; Hilf & Rolf, supra note 290, at 299.
386 Hilf & Rolf, supra note 290, at 301.
387 Schoneveld, supra note 299, at 21; Hilf & Rolf, supra note 290, at 301.
388 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-12; Hilf & Rolf, supra note 290, at 301; PEmEMANN,
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account these considerations, two major fields of application of
"generally accepted rules" can be distinguished. The first group in-
cludes cases in which the trade practices of a country are contrary to a
widely accepted trade agreement to which this country is not a party.
The second group is comprised of practices contrary to so-called
"soft" law.3 8 9
When drafting Council Regulation 2641/84 both the Commission
and the Council wanted to enable the Community to retaliate against
trade practices which were incompatible with GATT, its side agree-
ments, or with any other widely accepted trade agreement despite the
fact that the country concerned was not a party to that agreement.3 90
In such a case, the provisions of these agreements are considered to be
"generally accepted rules" as a great number of states adhere to them.
Some commentators suggest that the de facto application of GATT
rules, for example, to non-members is a violation of the principle of
public international law that those countries which are not party to a
treaty cannot be bound by its provisions.3 91 However, the characteriza-
tion of a foreign practice as "incompatible... with generally accepted
rules" only matters for the right of complaint of the EU industry and
for the Commission's competence to open an investigation.3 92 This
does not yet have any immediate negative consequences for the third
country concerned. Only the final stage of such an examination pro-
cedure, the taking of retaliatory action, directly affects the foreign
country.3 9 3 However, since Council Regulation 2641/84 only allows
retaliation if it is "compatible with international obligations and proce-
supra note 215, at 66; Christoph Vedder, Art. 11.3, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG 1 149
(Eberhard Grabitz ed., 1992).
389 Hilf & Rolf, supra note 290, at 301.
390 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-11 to 6-12.
391 Bronckers, supra note 274, at 724. The, origins of this general rule of international
law can be found in the Roman law principles of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt and res inter
alios acta. HUBERT THIERRY ET AL., DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 92-93 (5th ed. 1986); KNUT
IPSEN, V6LKERRECHT 138 (3d ed. 1990). These principles are considered to form a funda-
mental norm of customary international law which was reiterated several times in decisions of
both the Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) and its successor, the Interna-
tional Court ofJustice (I.CJ.). See, e.g., Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5,
at 27-28 (advisory opinion ofJuly 23); Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger-
many v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 27-29 (May 25); Territorial Jurisdiction of the
River Oder Commission (U.K, Czech., Den., Fr., Germany, Swed. v. Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 23, at 19-22 (Sept. 10); Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v.
Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 141 (June 7); Aerial Incident ofJuly 27, 1955 (Isr.
v. BuIg.), 1959 I.CJ. 127, 136-42 (May 26); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. and
F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, 26 (Feb. 20). Finally, Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 11.55 U.N.T.S. 331, 334, codified this rule of customary
international law by stating that "[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a
third State without its consent." See generally OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, VOL. I, PARTS
2 TO 4, at 1260-66 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds, 9th ed. 1992).
392 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-12, 6-14 to 6-15; Bourgeois & Laurent, supra note 274,
at 52.
393 Bourgeois & Laurent, supra note 274, at 52.
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dures,"3 94 the principle res inter alios acta 95 is not violated and Council
Regulation 2641/84 does not give any more rights to the Union.3 96
For example, in the Unauthorized Repr6duction of Sound Recordings in In-
donesia case,3 9 7 the complainant claimed that Indonesia did not com-
ply with the provisions of both the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works398 and the Universal Copy-
right Convention399 even though Indonesia was not a party to these
conventions. 40 0 The complainant alleged that "in view of the large
number and importance of countries adhering .to those Conventions"
they must be .regarded as "generally accepted rules."40 ' The Commis-
sion agreed with this point of view and initiated an investigation
against Indonesia.40 2
The second major field of application of "generally accepted
rules" are violations of so-called "soft" law,40 3 such as the OECD
codes404 or the U.N. code against restrictive business practices. 40 5.
iv. Injury to a "Community Industry"
The last prerequisite for an "illicit commercial practice" is that it
must have caused or threatened to cause injury to a "Community
industry."
b. Full Exercise of the "Community's Rights"
Under Article 1 of Council Regulation 2641/84,' the Union is not
limited to counteracting foreign "illicit commercial practices," it can
also retaliate in order to ensure "full exercise of the Community's
rights with regard to the commercial practices of third countries"
("clause b" procedures). 40 6 The "Community's rights" are defined in
Article 2(2) of Council Regulation 2641/84 as "those international
trade rights of which it may avail itself either under international law
394 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 10(3).
395 For a discussion of this principle, see supra note 391.
396 See Bourgeois & Laurent, supra note 274, at 52.
397 Notice of Initiation of an "Illicit Commercial Practice" Procedure Concerning the
Unauthorized Reproduction of Sound Recordings in Indonesia, 1987 OJ. (C 136) 3, 3 [here-
inafter Sound Recordings in Indonesia].
398 Berne Convention for 'the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
331 U.N.T.S. 217.
399 Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2732, 216 U.N.T.S. 133.
400 Sound Recordings 'in Indonesia, supra note 397, '1987 O.J. (C 136) at 3.
401 Id.
402 Id at 4.
403 See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of this term.
404 Ton Heukels, Rechtsprobleme der autonomen Handeispolitik der Europdischen Gemeinschaf
im Lichte des GATT, 30 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 972, 979 (1984).
405 Hilf & Rolf, supra note 290, at 302; Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-12; Bourgeois &
Laurent, supra note 274, at 53 n.26; PETERMANN, supra note 215, at 67; Vedder, supra note
388, 1 149.
406 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 1(b).
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or under generally accepted rules."40 7 Thus, Article 1 (b) refers to the
same rights whose infringement constitutes an "illicit commercial prac-
tice" under Article 1 (a).408 However, there are two major differences
with regard to the prerequisites for "clause a" procedures ("illicit com-
mercial practices") and "clause b" proceedings ("ensuring full exercise
of the Community's rights"). First, "clause b" only applies to practices
of third countries,40 9 while "clause a" refers to practices attributable to
third countries. 410 Therefore, the scope of application of "clause b" is
limited to practices of the foreign government. Contrary to "clause a,"
"clause b" does not apply to acts of semi-governmental or even private
bodies. 411 Second, if a Member States wants to lodge a complaint
under Article 1(b), it does not have to prove that the foreign trade
practice caused or threatened to cause any injury to the Community
industry.412 In this regard, the admissibility standards for complaints
by Member States under Article 1 (b) are remarkably lower than those
for petitions under Article 1 (a). However, up to now, no complaint
has been lodged under Article 1 (b).
2. Retaliatory Authority
Article 10(3) of Council Regulation 2641/84 provides for broad
retaliatory authority since it entitles the European Union to take "any
commercial policy measures." Notably, it allows:
(a) the suspension or withdrawal of any concession resulting from
commercial policy negotiations, (b) the raising of existing customs du-
ties or the introduction of any other charge on imports, (c) the intro-
duction of quantitative restrictions or any other measure modifying
import or export conditions or otherwise affecting trade with the third
country concerned.41
This very broad retaliatory authority, however, is severely limited by the
requirement that any commercial policy measure taken by the Union
has to be "compatible with existing international obligations and
procedures. 414
C. Judicial Review of Actions Taken Under Council Regulation 2641/
84
Since Council Regulation 2641/84 does not contain any provi-
sions concerning judicial review, the general rules on judicial review
apply so that a complaint has to meet the admissibility requirements
407 Id. at art. 2(2).
* 408 Steenbergen, supra note 286, at 433.
409 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 1 (b).
410 Id. at art. 2(1).
411 Steenbergen, supra note 286, at 433.
412 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 4(2).
413 Id. at art. 10(3)(a)-(c).
414 Id at art. 10(3).
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set out in Article 173(2) of the Treaty of Rome.4 15 Pursuant to this
provision, "any natural or legal person may ... institute proceedings
against a decision addressed to the person or against a decision which,
although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to an-
other person, is of direct or individual concern to the former. "416
1. Refusal to Initiate an Examination Procedure
The question whether the refusal of the Commission to initiate an
examination procedure can be reviewed by the E.C.J., and if yes, how
far, was answered in several cases. All of them dealt with complaints of
the EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation (Fediol). The
first Fediol case (Fediol 1)417 dealt with the refusal of the Commission to
open an anti-subsidy proceeding with regard to the imports of soya
bean oil cakes from Brazil. As the relevant provisions of Council Regu-
lation 2641/84 are mainly modeled after the respective provisions of
the anti-subsidy/anti-dumping regulation 2423/88,418 the rules estab-
lished in Fediol I by the E.C.J. with respect to the anti-subsidy regula-
tion can also be applied to cases involving Council Regulation 2641/
84.419 The court stated:
that the regulation recognizes the existence of a legitimate interest on
the part of the Community producers in the adoption of anti-subsidy
measures and that it [the regulation] defines certain specific [proce-
dural] rights in their favor, namely the right to submit to the Commis-
sion all evidence which they consider appropriate, the right to see all
information obtained by the Commission subject to certain excep-
tions, the right to be heard at their request, and to have the opportu-
nity of meeting the other parties concerned in the same proceeding,
and finally the right to be informed if the Commission decides not to
pursue a complaint.4 20
From these facts, the E.CJ. concluded that complainants have a
right to bring an action before the E.C.J., if it is alleged that one of the
above-mentioned procedural rights has been violated by the Commis-
sion.421 However, the court did not limit judicial review to an alleged
infringement of these procedural rights. It also acknowledged a right
to bring an action in cases where it is claimed that the Commission:
has committed manifest errors in its assessment of the facts, has omit-
ted to take into consideration any essential matters of such a nature as
415 EEC T.EArv, supra note 354, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76.
416 Id
417 Fediol I, supra note 306, 1983 E.C.R. 2913.
418 Compare the wording of Article 7 of Council Regulation 2423/88, 1988 O.J. (L 209)
1, 9 and that of its predecessors Council Regulations 288/82, 1982 O.J. (L 35) 1, and 2176/
84, 1984 O.J. (L 201) 1, on one hand, and of Article 6 of Council Regulation 2641/84, 1984
O.J. (L 252) 1, 3-4, on the other hand, which provide for the same procedure both in anti-
subsidy/dumping cases and in cases under Council Regulation 2641/84.
419 VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 349, 1 4495; Hilf & Rolf, supra note 290, at 309; Zoller,
supra note 211, at 233; Bronckers, supra note 274, at 741; Vedder, supra note 388, 152.
420 Fediol I, supra note 306, 1983 E.C.R. at 2934.
421 Id. at 2935.
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to give rise to a belief in the existence of [an illicit commercial prac-
tice] or has based the reasons for its decisions on considerations
amounting to a misuse of powers.
4 22
Thus, since the E.C.J., to a certain extent, can also review discre-
tionary decisions of the Commission, the fact that the Council inserted
the term "necessary in the interest of the Community," when drafting
Regulation 2641/84, does not hinder judicial review of the Commis-
sion's decisions whether or not to initiate an investigation under Arti-
cle 6(1) of Council Regulation 2641/84.423 This interpretation of the
reviewability of discretionary decisions was reaffirmed in Fediol 124
where the E.C.J. held "that, even though a discretion has been con-
ferred on the Commission in the matter at issue, the Court is required
to verify whether or not" the Commission used its discretion in a cor-
rect way.42 5 The criteria used in this test were the same as those men-
tioned in Fediol L426
In Fediol 111,427 the E.C.J. extended the scope of judicial review
with regard to decisions of the Commission whether or not to initiate
an investigation. 428 Plaintiff Fediol tried to attack a decision of the
Commission rejecting a complaint lodged by Fediol in which Fediol
requested an examination procedure with regard to certain commer-
cial practices of Argentina concerning the export 'of soya cake.429
Fediol argued that the Commission, when characterizing the Argentin-
ean trade practices as being in conformity with the GATT, interpreted
the GATT in a wrong way.430 The Commission claimed that the action
was unfounded since Fediol was not permitted to put forward submis-
sions questioning the Commission's interpretation of the GATT. 431
The E.C.J. did not agree with the Commission, and in a rather apodic-
tic way, held that complainants can:
in proceedings before the Court, rely on the provisions of the GATT
in order to obtain a ruling on whether conduct criticized in a com-
plaint lodged under Article 3 of Regulation No 2641/84 constitutes an
illicit commercial practice within the meaning of that regulation...
[Therefore] economic agents are entitled to request the Court to exer-
cise its powers of review over the legality of the Commission's decision
applying [GATT] provisions. 43 2
422 I.j
423 Bronckers, supra note 274, at 742 n.350; Hilf & Rolf, supra note 290, at 309.
424 Case 188/85, EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation (Fediol) v. Com-
mission, 1988 E.C.R. 4221 [hereinafter Fediol I].
425 Id. at 4223.
426 Id. See also supra notes 417-22 and accompanying text; Case 264/82, Timex Corp. v.
Council and Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 849, 866, where the E.C.J. also referred to the criteria
mentioned in Fediol L
427 Fediol III, supra note 293, 1989 E.C.R. 1825.
428 Id. at 1831.
429 Id. at 1826.
430 Id. at 1829.
431 Id, at 1830.
432 Id. at 1831.
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As a result of the three Fediol cases discussed above, a petitioner
can attack a refusal by the Commission to initiate an examination for
three main reasons: (1) the Commission violated the petitioner's pro-
cedural rights (Fediol I); (2) the Commission misused its discretionary
power when determining whether the opening of an investigation was
in the "interest of the Community" (Fediol /and II); and (3) the Com-
mission incorrectly interpreted the term "illicit commercial practice"
(Fediol III). However, it should be noted that although the Court will
review discretionary decisions of the Commission and though there is
nothing like a political question doctrine in European law, this judicial
review will not provide the complainant with much assistance because
it is highly unlikely that the Court will find a misuse of discretion.4 33
Rather, the E.C.J. explicitly acknowledged that the Commission had "a
very wide discretion to decide, in terms of the interests of the Commu-
nity, any measures needed to deal with the situation."4 34 Therefore,
unsuccessful petitioners cannot confidently rely upon the Court's re-
view of action by the Commission under Council Regulation 2641/
84.435
2. Termination of an Examination Proceeding and Adoption of
Commercial Policy Measures
A complainant who wants to attack the decision of the Commis-
sion to terminate an examination procedure pursuant to Article 9(1)
and (2) (a) of Council Regulation 2641/84, or a Council decision to
take certain retaliatory actions, has the same right to an action before
the E.C.J. as a petitioner attacking a refusal to initiate an investiga-
tion.436 Thus, the E.C.J. will review whether the Commission violated
the complainants' procedural rights and whether the Council, when
adopting trade policy measures, has misused its discretionary power.4 37
However, here again, the institutions of the Union have "very wide dis-
cretion"438 thus making the annulment of a Commission or Council
decision on this ground rather unlikely.
IV. Comparison
Though both section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Council
Regulation 2641/84 authorize trade retaliation against foreign coun-
tries using trade practices which are deemed to be unfair or "illicit,"439
433 PETERMANN, supra note 215, at 137.
434 Fediol I, supra note 306, 1983 E.C.R. 2913, 2934-35 (emphasis added).
435 Appleton, supra note 293, at 261.
436 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-43 to 6-44, 6-47; Hilf & Rolf, supra note 290, at 309-
10.
437 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-47.
438 Fediol I, supra note 306, 1983 E.C.R. at 2934-35; Dirk Petermann, Gerichtlicher Rechtss-
chutz in Verfahren der EG-Kommission gegen "Unerlaubte Handedspraktiken" 36 RECHT DER INTERNA.
TIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 279, 281-82 (1990).
439 Devine, supra note 33, at 1108-09.
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and though Council Regulation 2641/84 can, at least, partly be consid-
ered as an express countermeasure against section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974, the two instruments show remarkable differences with re-
gard both to their procedural and substantive law. Moreover, it is in-
teresting to note that the actual use of the retaliatory authority
provided for in the two instruments made by the United States and the
European Union differs enormously. For instance, from July 1975,
when the first petition under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 was
received, 440 until May 1993, the USTR had to deal with ninety-one
cases.441 Out of these ninety-one cases, forty-four were initiated after
September 1984,442 the date of the enactment of Council Regulation
2641/84. In contrast, Council Regulation 2641/84, up to now, has
been invoked in not more than six cases. 443
A. Procedural Law
1. Initiation of an Examination Procedure
The procedural law of the two statutes reflects the different ap-
proaches of the U.S. legislator, on one hand, and the European legisla-
tor, on the other hand, toward the role of private petitioners in the
triggering of an investigation. In 1974, Congress, believing that the
Executive would not use the new instrument efficiently and often
enough, provided for a complaint procedure whereby private parties
could request the USTR to initiate an examination procedure in order
to increase the likelihood of retaliatory action. 444 Because Congress
wanted to encourage private petitions, the threshold requirements for
the admissibility of a complaint are easy to satisfy and do not present a
440 Guatemala Cargo Preference case, No. 301-1, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,134 (1975), where a
petition was filed by Delta Steamship Inc. on July 1, 1975. USTR TABLE or SECTION 301
CAsES, supra note 7, at 49:0841.
441 Id. at 49:0841-0864.
442 Id. at 49:0848-0864.
443 Commission, Notice of Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning Illicit
Commercial Practices within the Meaning of Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84, Consisting of
the Exclusion from the [U.S.] Market of the Unlicensed Importation of Certain Aramid Fibre
Manufactured by Akzo NV or its Affiliated Companies outside the United States, 1986 OJ. (C
25) 2; Court ofJustice, Action brought on Mar. 6, 1987 by the Seed Crushers' and Oil Produ-
cers' Federation (Fediol) against the Commission of the European Communities, 1987 OJ.
(C 96) 8; Commission, Notice of Initiation of an 'Illicit Commercial Practice' Procedure
Concerning the Unauthorized Reproduction of Sound Recordings in Indonesia, 1987 OJ.
(C 136) 3; Commission Decision of Dec. 23, 1988 Rejecting the Complaint Lodged by Smith
Kline & French Lab. Ltd. againstJordan under Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84, 1989
OJ. (L 30) 67; Commission, Notice of Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning
Illicit Commercial Practice within the Meaning of Regulation (EEC) No 2641/84 Consisting
of the Imposition in Japan of a Port Charge or Fee Used for the Creation of the Harbour
Management Fund, 1991 OJ. (C 40) 18; Commission, Notice of Initiation of an Examination
Procedure Concerning Illicit Commercial Practice within the Meaning of Regulation (EEC)
No. 2641/84, Consisting of Piracy of Community Sound Recordings in Thailand, 1991 OJ.
(C 189) 26.
444 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186.
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serious hurdle for private petitioners. 445 In contrast, the Council,
when passing Council Regulation 2641/84, deliberately set high stan-
dards for the admissibility of private complaints in order to allay the
concerns of some Member States which were against any sort of private
involvement."a 6 Therefore, under European law, the right of private
parties to lodge complaints is in many respects much more limited
than under U.S. law.
First, under Council Regulation 2641/84 a petitioner must repre-
sent a "Community industry,"447 while under section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974, any "interested person"-a very broadly defined term4 4 8 -
has standing.44 9 Second, under Council Regulation 2641/84, private
parties can only complain about foreign "illicit commercial practices"
("clause a" procedures). They cannot lodge complaints aiming at en-
suring "full exercise of the Community's rights" ("clause b" proce-
dures) because this right is reserved to the Member States. 450 Under
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, however, private parties can also
lodge a petition with the USTR alleging that "the rights of the United
States under any trade agreement are being denied"45 1 or that a for-
eign trade practice "violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of,
or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade
agreement."452 This limitation of European petitioners to "clause a"
procedures implies a further disadvantage for petitioners since "clause
a" procedures always require that a "Community industry" has suffered
injury resulting from the foreign "illicit commercial practice."4 53 In
contrast, U.S. petitioners can invoke section 301(a) (1) (A) and (B) (i)
of Trade Act of 1974 even though the foreign unfair trade practice has
not caused any injury to U.S. commerce. 454
Third, under Council Regulation 2641/84, a- private complaint is
only admissible if the petitioner furnishes sufficient proof of the exist-
ence of both the alleged "illicit commercial practice" and the injury to
a "Community industry."455 Under section 301 of the Trade Act of
445 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of these requirements.
446 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-19; Bronckers, supra note 274, at 736; Hilf, supra note
296, at 449-50. See also supra notes 275-301 and accompanying text.
447 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, art. 3(1). See also supra notes 275-84 and accompany-
ing text.
448 See the definitions of "interested person" in 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d) (9) (1988) and 15
C.F.R. § 2006.0(b) (1994). See also supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
449 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (1988).
450 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 3(1) and 4(1).
451 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1) (A) (1988).
452 Id. § 2411(a) (1) (B) (i) (1988).
453 See supra notes 294-301 and accompanying text.
454 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a)(1)(A) and (B)(i). However, in case of an action under section
301(a) (1) (B) (ii) or (b)(1), the foreign unfair trade practice must have burdened or re-
stricted U.S. commerce. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) or (b)(1) (1988). See also supra notes 124-26
and accompanying text.
455 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 3(2). Se supra notes 285-301 and accompanying
text.
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1974, however, a private complainant only has to set forth allegations
supporting the petition; proof is not needed.45 6
Fourth, even if a complaint meets these high admissibility stan-
dards, it is not clear whether the Commission will open an examina-
tion procedure as the initiation of an investigation lies within the
broad, if not unlimited, discretion of the Commission.457 In contrast,
the USTR only has discretion if the petitioner complains about an al-
legedly "discriminatory" or "unreasonable" foreign trade practice. In
all other cases, the opening of an investigation is mandatory if all ad-
missibility requirements are fulfilled.458
Moreover, Council Regulation 2641/84 does not only limit the
right of private petitioners to lodge complaints it also forbids the Com-
mission to self-initiate an investigation. 459 This stands in sharp con-
trast to the nearly two-thirds of investigations under section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 which have been self-initiated by the USTR either
under section 302(b)(1),460 "Special 301,"461 or "Super 301"462 since
the enactment of the Omnibus Trade Competitiveness Act of 1988.
This lack of authority to self-initiate examination proceedings under
Council Regulation 2641/84 constitutes an important obstacle to the
efficient use of Council Regulation 2641/84. Furthermore, the possi-
bility of complaints by the Member States has proven to be an inade-
quate substitute since, up to now, no Member State made use of this
opportunity.
All in all, while section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 both encour-
ages private complaints and provides for the aggressive use of the
USTR's power to self-initiate investigations, the' procedural law of
Council Regulation 2641/84 makes it rather difficult to trigger pro-
ceedings. This may, at least partly, explain why, from 1984 up to now,
only six complaints were lodged under Council Regulation 2641/
84,463 two of which were rejected.464
456 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (1988). See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
457 See supra notes 302-09 and accompanying text. Pursuant to Article 6(1) of Council
Regulation 2641/84, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1, 3, the Commission can decide whether the opening
of an examination procedure is "in the interest of the Community."
458 19 U.S.C. § 2412(c) (1988). See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
459 See supra notes 323-32 and accompanying text.
460 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1) (1988).
461 Id. § 2412(b)(2) (1988).
462 Id. § 2420(b) (1988). Fifteen out of twenty-three investigations were self-initiated.
These fifteen self-initiated investigations can be broken down into three main groups: (1)
"normal" self-initiations pursuant to section 302(b)(1)(A) (Docket Nos. 301-69, 71, 81, 87,
88); (2) "Special 301" (Docket Nos. 301-85, 86, 89, 91); and (3) "Super 301" (Docket Nos.
301-73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78). USTR TaLE OF SECTION 301 CAsES, supra note 7.
463 For a list of cases, see supra note 443.
464 Soya Beans from Argentina case, see 1987 O.J. (C 96) 8; Patent Protection in Jordan
case, 1989 O.J. (L 30) 67 (Commission decision).
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2. Course of the Examination Procedure
The course of the examination procedure both under section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 and under Council Regulation 2641/84 is
similar. Both instruments give any interested party an opportunity to
submit briefs and rebuttal briefs and provide for a hearing of the par-
ties concerned. 465 Therefore, in both cases, the procedure is transpar-
ent (i;e., it is public, adversarial, and administered in conformity with
due process standards).466 Moreover, the procedural law of both in-
struments obliges the USTR and the Commission to trigger interna-
tional dispute settlement proceedings if such proceedings are required
under international law (e.g., under the GAIT).467
B. Substantive Law
1. Mandatory and Discretionary Action
At first glance, the most remarkable difference between the sub-
stantive law of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and of Council
Regulation 2641/84 seems to be that section 301 provides for
mandatory trade retaliation under certain circumstances (i.e., it
obliges the USTR to take retaliatory action).468 The rationale behind
this legislation is that Congress, given its "festering frustration" with
the Executive's hesitant use of its retaliatory authority, wanted to force
the Executive Branch into action. 469 In contrast, Council Regulation
2641/84 provides for broad discretion of the Commission and of the
Council when deciding whether or not to retaliate. 470 However, given
the fact that section 301 contains several exceptions to mandatory ac-
tion (notably the national economic interest waiver exemption), which
allow the USTR not to act even though a certain foreign trade practice
is actionable, 47 1 the actual outcome is not as different as it first appears
to be. One commentator even suggested that the introduction of
mandatory retaliation in 1988 "- while posited in bold language -
change [d] little from prior law."4 72
2. Actionable Practices
The scope of Council Regulation 2641/84 is considerably more
465 19 U.S.C. § 2414(b)(1)(A) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.8(a) and (c) (1994). Reg. 2641/
84, supra note 260, at art. 6(5). See supra notes 76-79 and 335-40 and accompanying text.
466 Zoller, supra note 211, at 232.
467 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (2) (1988); Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at aft. 10(2). See supra
notes 84-85 and 362-65 and accompanying text.
468 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1988).
469 PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO RESPOND TO UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES: HEARING ON Ti-
TLE II OF S. 1860 AND S. 1862 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 64
(1986).
470 The Council only decides to retaliate if "action is necessary in the interests of the
Community." Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 10(1).
471 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (2) (B) (1988). See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
472 Ashman. supra note 60, at 141.
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limited than that of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, since Council
Regulation 2641/84 only covers trade in goods but not trade in serv-
ices and investment. 473 In contrast, section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 applies to all trade. 474
Moreover, under Council Regulation 2641/84, both "clause a"
and "clause b" procedures address foreign trade practices which are
incompatible with international law or with "generally accepted
rules." 475 Taking into consideration the legislative history of Council
Regulation 2641/84, both terms can be defined rather clearly. Even
for the term "generally accepted rules," there exist at least some stan-
dards for interpretation since all commentators agree that the notion
of "generally accepted rules" refers either to widely accepted trade
agreements such as the GATT or to "soft" law.47 6 The possibility that
by invoking a violation of "generally accepted rules" the European
Union might infringe the principle of res inter alios acta is excluded by
the fact that any retaliatory action taken by the Union has to be in
conformity with international law.477
Section 301, by allowing retaliation against "unreasonable" foreign
commercial practices, however, defines actionable practices in a much
broader way. While the provisions referring to acts which violate a
trade agreement, or which are "unjustifiable," generally do not give
rise to foreign concerns, since they only allow retaliation against for-
eign trade practices which are illegal under international law, the
USTR's power to retaliate against "unreasonable" practices was harshly
attacked by both the European Union4 78 and Japan.479 Due to the
difficulty in defining the term "unreasonable," 480 the United States
might retaliate against foreign trade practices which though they are
deemed to be "unfair and inequitable"48 1 are in perfect conformity
with international law. 482 In contrast, in Council Regulation 2641/84,
the scope of action is limited by the requirement that all retaliatory
action taken by the European Union has to be compatible with inter-
473 Bourgeois, supra note 278, at 6-8; Hill & Rolf, supra note 290, at 304; Bronckers, supra
note 274, at 734-35. See supra notes 369-78 and accompanying text.
474 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(1) (1988). See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
475 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 2(1) and (2).
476 See supra notes 387-405 and accompanying text.
477 Id. See supra note 391 for a discussion of res inter alios acta.
478 See, e.g., Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, A European View of the 1988 U.S. Trade Act and Section
301, in AGcREssSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMEmIcA's 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 261-65 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
479 See, e.g., Makoto Kuroda, Super 301 and Japan, in AGGREssrVE UNILATERALISM:
AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLIC AND THE WORLD TRADING SYsTEM 219-31 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
480 See supra notes 173-92 and accompanying text.
481 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(A) (1988).
482 See the statutory definition of "unreasonable" practices: "An act, policy, or practice is
unreasonable if the act, policy, or practice, while not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent
with, the international egal rights of the United States, is otherwise unfair and inequitable." Id.
§ 2411 (d) (3) (A) (1988) (emphasis added).
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national law.48 3 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 does not contain
such a limitation. Therefore, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, by
referring to "unreasonable" foreign trade practices has the potential of
violating international law in general and the GATT in particular. 484
C. Judicial Review
With regard to judicial review, the differences between European
law and section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 are also important. An
American petitioner whose complaint was rejected by the USTR, or an
importer whose business suffers from an increase in duties on certain
foreign products resulting from retaliatory action, are barred from at-
tacking the decisions of the USTR in the courts under the political
question doctrine. 485 Under European law, however, decisions of the
Commission and the Council are, to a certain extent, subject to judicial
review. Yet, the effect of such a right to judicial review is rather limited
because in trade matters, the E.C.J. grants very broad discretion to
both the Commission and the Council.48 6 Thus, only manifest errors
will lead to an annulment of a Commission or Council decision.
V. Conclusion
Comparing solely the number of examination procedures under
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 with that of investigations under
Council Regulation 2641/84, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
seems to be more efficient in addressing foreign unfair trade practices.
However, as shown above, the discrepancy in the number of investiga-
tions is above all due to the very high admissibility standards for private
complaints under European law48 7 and to the fact that the Commis-
sion is not allowed to self-initiate examination procedures under Coun-
cil Regulation 2641/84.488 Looking to the outcome of investigations
under Council Regulation 2641/84, the "new instrument of commer-
cial policy" seems to be able to fulfill its purposes. In one case, the
Union obtained a favorable GATT decision, 489 and also in two of the
other four examination proceedings, which have been opened, the
outcome ended with the foreign country agreeing to abandon its "il-
licit commercial practice."49 0 The fourth investigation is still pend-
483 Reg. 2641/84, supra note 260, at art. 10(3).
484 Hudec, supra note 190, at 124; Bronckers, supra note 274, at 661.
485 See supra notes 223-58 and accompanying text.
486 See supra notes 415-38 and accompanying text.
487 Hilf, supra note 296, at 450.
488 See supra notes 323-32 and accompanying text.
489 Certain Aramid Fibre case, Notice of Initiation, 1986 O.J. (C 25) 2; Commission Deci-
sion on the Initiation of an International Consultation and Dispute Settlement Procedure,
1987 O.J. (L 117) 18; United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Report by the Panel Adopted
on 7 November 1989, 36 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TAriujs AND TRADE, BASic INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 345-402 (1988/1989).
490 Unauthorized Reproduction of Sound Recordings in Indonesia case, Notice of Initia-
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ing.491 In another case, the mere threat of an investigation under
Council Regulation 2641/84 caused the foreign country concerned to
discontinue the allegedly unfair trade practice. 492 Thus, in order to
encourage the wider use of Council Regulation 2641/84, it is not pri-
marily the substantive law that has to be changed but the procedural
law with its exaggerated admissibility requirements for private peti-
tions 493 and its lack of a provision enabling the Commission to self-
initiate proceedings.494 However, in order to avoid "strained interpre-
tation[s]" 495 of Council Regulation 2641/84 (like in the Japan Harbor
Management Fund case),496 the scope of application of Council Regula-
tion 2641/84 should be extended to investments and to trade in
services.
tion, 1987 O.J. (C 136) 3. Japan Harbor Management Fund case, Notice of Initiation, 1991
OJ. (C 40) 18.
491 Piracy of Community Sound Recordings in Thailand case, Notice of Initiation, 1991
OJ. (C 189) 26.
492 Soon after the adoption of Council Regulation 2641/84, the Community producers
of Scotch whiskey informed the Bulgarian government that they intended to file a complaint
under Council Regulation 2641/84 against Bulgaria for allowing the sale and export of a
local Bulgarian liquor under the designation "Scotch Whiskey." Shortly after this notifica-
tion, the Bulgarian authorities stopped the use of the controversial designation. M.I.B. Ar-
nold & M. C.E.J. Bronckers, The EEC New Trade Policy Instrument: Some Comments on Its
Application, 22J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1988, at 19, 36.
493 However, it should be noted that, when enacting Council Regulation 2641/84, the
Council's main objective was not the protection of private interests but as indicated by the
title of Council Regulation 2641/84, the strengthening of the common commercial policy.
Hilf, supra note 296, at 447.
494 See, e.g., PETERMANN, supra note 215, at 147.
495 Schoneveld, supra note 299, at 33.
496 See supra notes 376-78 and accompanying text.
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